AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ART OF Rhetorick.

Composed for the benefit of young Schollars and others, who have not opportunity of being instructed in the Latine tongue; and is very helpful to understand the figurative expressions in the holy Scriptures.

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By *John Newton*, D. D.

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BRITISH
MUSEUM

To the Reader.

OUr *Engliſh Schoolmaſters, being now furniſhed with convenient helps, for the inſtructing of their Schollars in Grammar, Arithmetick, Geometry, Muſick and Aſtronomy; I come to theſe two liberal Arts, which are in themſelves the moſt ſublime and difficult; This of Rhetorick, and the other of Logick. Theſe are the Arts and Sciences of which Children are the leaſt capable, and therefore I have reſerved them for the laſt place; and for this reaſon it is I ſup-*

pose that Logick is generally look-
ed upon, as a noli me tangere,
an Art by no means to be taught
in schools, but must be altoge-
ther reserved for the University;
but for as much as Rhetorick is
permitted the Grammar Master
without controle, and that it is so
nearly allied to Logick, as that it
cannot be attained (the Oratorical
part especially) without some
knowledge of it, let me without
any further dint of argument, beg
thus much favour of thee, who-
ever thou art into whose hands
these Tracts shall fall, not too
severely to prohibit a small Sy-
stem, a short introduction to Lo-
gick to bear Rhetorick company,
if it be but to compleat our En-

glish

gliſh Academy (of which this is the ſixth part:) Perhaps the advantage that our young ſtudents ſhall reap, by being inſtructed in this ſcience before they ſmell the Univerſity air, may make thee compenſation for thy indulgence. Tell me I pray thee, is it not reaſonable that the terms which Rhetoricians uſe, being borrowed from other Arts, eſpecially from Logick, ſhould be explained; and if this which cannot be fairly denied, will but be granted me, I will not fear their being ſlighted, for their homeſpun garments in which they are clad; for I perſwade my ſelf, that none will be againſt their ſpeaking Engliſh, but ſuch illiterate Schoolmaſters,

who being ſent to the Univerſity before they were fit for it, and compelled for want of maintenance, very quickly to forſake it again, do think it a diſparagement to them to teach Engliſh, when yet alas, it is many times very little, very little indeed that they underſtand of other Languages, nay and it were well if they did underſtand the Rules for reading and writing of their own; all others, if they are not already, will eaſily be perſwaded to believe, that it is no impoſſible thing for a man to be an Orator or Rhetorician in any language, and that the precepts of Rhetorick may be beſt taught and practiſed, in mens native tongue,

as much conducing to and facilitating their learning of them, in a strange one; but in what language soever the precepts of this Art are first taught, methinks it is an unreasonable task, that is that is imposed upon young Lads at School, not much unlike the burthen, that the Ægyptian taskmasters laid upon the children of Israel, *when they required of them such a tale of Brick, and yet would allow them no straw. I thought it hard my self, that I should be commanded to make a Theam before I had any other instructions for framing thereof than what* Clark's Formulæ *or* Farnabie's Rhetorick *did afford me: As for the Oratorical part of*

Butler's Rhetorick was to us *like* terra incognita, *and it is well if it be otherwise yet*; *and then for matter, what were our helps,* Tullies *sentences*, Prudners *Symbols, and* Lycosthenes, *for as for History or Morality, we were perhaps taught five or six leaves in* Justin, *as much in* Salust, Lucius Florus, *and* Cæsars *Commentaries, and were able to give as good an account at last, of these Authors in reference to the matter of which they have written, as if we had never seen the books, or heard of their names; now from these books thus throughly read and understood, or rather neglected and scarce known, I cannot but smile yet,*

and

and I perſwade my ſelf that many ſchool boys now do even laugh in themſelves, that they can in their exerciſes of this nature put ſuch palpable cheats upon their Maſters, and their Maſters either not ſeeing them, or not in the leaſt take notice of them: but they have more cauſe, did they but underſtand it, to lament their loſs of time, and the great cheat that their Maſters put on them: for a lad having a Theam or ſentence given him, runs preſently to Clark's Formulæ, Farnabie's Index Rhetoricus, *and there ſeeks for ſome Exordium, of half a dozen lines or more, and thence tranſcribes with very ſlender alteration ſo much as he thinks*

thinks convenient for that time; how much to his preſent purpoſe, he doth as little care as underſtand; and for his next part, the narration of his ſentence in other explicatory words, he ſo little underſtands how to do it, that ſetting aſide the form for that purpoſe, which is alſo tranſcribed from thoſe books, you hear but little of it; to find matter for confirmation is all his trouble, now for a Wits commonwealth, *and if he find any thing there, all his care is to tranſlate it Grammatically true; as for the reſt, theſe forms* Reuſner's *Symbols and* Licoſthenes, *are the books that muſt enrich him, and if he can but inſert two or three phraſes,*

ſes, that he did collect from his late lectures, he is a diligent boy, and has done his Tax roundly, when alas if the lad did but ſee his own exerciſe in his vulgar tongue, he would laugh at himſelf for writing ſo many words, and thoſe none of his own neither, and all to ſo little purpoſe; and can we expect that ever this ſhould be amended, unleſs you reſpite theſe exerciſes, till lads are acquainted with the Rules of invention, have read and digeſted ſome good Hiſtories and moral diſcourſes, and have furniſhed themſelves with matter from their own reading, and have been inſtructed how to diſpoſe of it in his paper books, that he may

know

know where to find whatever he hath formerly read of any ſubject; and whether this may not be more ſpeedily done in every ones native language, and to as good purpoſe, as in a language with which they are not acquainted, is I think very worthy thy conſideration. A lad would ſurely much ſooner underſtand what is ſence, by reading books in his native language, than in any other whatſœver, and intelligibly read more at a time alſo, ſo that in this way of education, beſides the knowledge that young Lads might have, in thoſe uſeful Sciences of Arithmetick, Geometry, Muſick, and Aſtronomy, they might have much

more true and solid knowledge, in this of Rhetorick also, than now they have, though their time at School is wholly spent in the exercise of it, and the getting of a few Latine and Greek words and phrases; and were they but thus prepared for these languages, by a competent and a well grounded knowledge in their own, and their affections engaged to the love of learning, by that skill in the sciences which they have or might attain, what I pray would be wanting save only words, and with what wonderful ease might that defect be supplied; how throughly acquainted with the Rules of the Latine and Greek Grammars, without

torturing

torturing and tormenting themſelves with a uſeleſs endeavour to repeat orderly the rules in thoſe Grammars by heart; the preſcriptions of Pliny *in his Epiſtle to his friend* Fuſcus, Epiſtol. lib. 6. Epiſt. 7. *will ſurely be ſufficient to manifeſt: His words are,* Utile in primis, ut multi præcipiunt, ex Græco in Latinum, & ex Latino vertere in Græcum: Quo genere exercitationis, proprietas ſplendorq; verborum, apta ſtructura ſententiarum, figurarum copia, & explicandi vis colligitur. Præterea imitatione optimorum, facultas ſimilia inveniendi paratur: & quæ legentem fefelliſſent, transferentem fugere non poſſunt.

possunt. Intelligentia ex hoc & judicium acquiritur. *And for evident proof of learning these tongues, without the horrible toil of Grammar, I will mention Queen* Elizabeth *of blessed memory, who as her Tutor Mr.* Aschum *tells us (in the second book of his Schoolmaster, page 50.) never took Greek or Latine Grammar in her hand, after the first declining of a Noun and a Verb, but only by this double translating of* Demosthenes *and* Isocrates *dayly without missing every forenoon, and likewise some part of* Tully *every afternoon, for the space of a year or two, did attain to such a perfect understanding in both the tongues, and*

to

to ſuch a ready utterance of the Latine, *and that with ſuch a judgment, as that but few in both Univerſities, or elſewhere in* England, *were to be compared with her: ſo then an Engliſh School, where Children might be inſtructed in the ſciences would not only ſend them forth with all the uſeful accompliſhments for any Trade, but further thoſe, that are intended for the Univerſity or any learned profeſſion, in the getting of the* Latine *and* Greek *tongues alſo.*

And having ſaid thus much for bringing all the ſciences into Engliſh, ſome account may be reaſonably expected concerning this of Rhetorick with which I preſent

ſent thee now, of which I muſt ſay, as my learned Mr. William Dugard *in his* Rhetorices Elementa, Animadvertendum eſt Quæſtiones haſe, maximam partem, ad Caroli Butleri Rhetoricam, quæ vulgo in Scholis teritur, formari; *the truth is, the form and Method of this our Rhetorick, in reſpect of Elocution, ſome examples only excepted, is the ſame with* Butler, *and as for invention and diſpoſition, I have very much followed the firſt part of that excellent piece of Oratory, which* Michael Radau *hath publiſhed under the title of* Orator Extemporaneus, *from whence I might have taken much more than I have, but that I was afraid*

fraid of being too prolixe and over burthoning my young English Rhetorician: if this which I have done shall find acceptance, I may be perswaded, if God shall lend me life, and it be thought necessary, more fully to explain these precepts with variety of examples; this in the mean I here recommend to thy perusal; and for the desire I have to contribute something towards the removal of that burthen which is in this science imposed on children, am very willing to endure thy censure and judgment, be it never so severe against me. And do therefore rest, thine in the Lord.

John Newton.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ART OF Rhetorick.

CHAP. I.

Of the Art of Rhetorick *in the Generall.*

RHETORICR *is the Art or faculty of eloquent and delightfull speaking.*

And this eloquent and delightfull speaking, is that which we usually call *Oratory*:

The difference therefore between a *Rhetorician* and an *Oratour* is this; the *Rhetorician* delivers precepts and directions for this eloquent ſpeaking, and the *Oratour* doth put theſe precepts and directions into practice.

In this Art of *Rhetorick* then or in theſe precepts and directions for *Oratory*, three things muſt be conſidered.

1. The *Matter* about which it is converſant.
2. The *End* for which it ſerveth.
3. The *Meanes* by which that end may be attained.

The *Matter* or *Subject* of this Art or facultie is any thing whatſoever which may be diſcourſed or queſtioned; any Theam or Caſe.

A Theam *is an infinite Queſtion in which an inquiry is made in the general concerning the Theſis or Poſition*; as, *whether it be fit to wage War.*

A Caſe *is a Queſtion confined to perſons and times, in which a particular inquiry is made concerning the Hypotheſis or matter in diſpute*; as, *whether it be fit for* England *to wage War with the* Dutch.

2. The *End* or *Ends* for which Rhetorich ſerveth are theſe.

1. To tickle and delight the eares of the

the Auditors that they may be willing to hear that which is intended to be delivered.

2. To inform their judgments, and by ſtrength of argument to beget a beliefe of that which is ſpoken.

3. To move the affections and beget a willingneſs either to do themſelves, or to aſſiſt in the actions of others, or to juſtifie that which is ſaid or done.

Laſtly, The *wayes* and *meanes* by which theſe ends may be attained, are three, *Nature*, *Art*, and *Practice*.

Natural abilities do much conduce to the attaining of this excellent faculty; for they that are naturally ingenious, and have a good memory will eaſily attain to this Art of eloquent and delightfull ſpeaking; but where Nature is defective, more care and diligence muſt be uſed, that the defects of Nature may be in part at leaſt ſupplied by Art, whoſe beſt companion is a general knowledge of things, which if a young Student have not as yet attained unto, it is at leaſt neceſſary, that he ſhould perfectly underſtand the Theam or caſe propounded, or elſe the Rules of Art will ſtand him but in little ſtead; for how ſhould he diſpoſe of *Matter* before he hath it?

it? And in vain do we ſpeak of *Uſe* and *Practice*, where *Knowledge* which muſt furniſh us with *Matter*, and *Art* which muſt teach us to *diſpoſe* of it, are both wanting. But naturall abilities being preſuppoſed, and matter acquired by diligent reading and obſervation; I ſhall here ſhew how thoſe naturall endowments may be by art improved, and the prepared matter ſo diſpoſed and ordered, as that they may make way for Uſe and Practice.

CHAP. II.

Of Invention.

THE Rules of this Art or Faculty of Rhetoricall and delightfull ſpeaking are commonly reduced unto five heads, *Invention*, *Diſpoſition*, *Elocution*, *Memory* and *Pronunciation*.

The firſt of theſe is *Invention*, in which we muſt conſider three things; Firſt, what we are *to invent*; Secondly by what Arguments we may confirm the *matter invented*: Thirdly, from what Topickes or generall heads, thoſe Arguments may be raiſed.

And

And *First*, we are to consider what it is that we are to invent; and the thing or matter which we are to invent or find out, is the scope and purpose, of the intended Oration; that is, we must propound some certain proposition, to which we mean to direct our speech; and of those several propositions which may be raised from the Subject propounded, we should still make choice of that, which is most agreeable to the sentence given, most sutеable to the present occasion, most profitable, and that which the Auditors may probably best apprehend. But now a dayes our Oratours do much labour to find out some acute proposition, and that proposition is so stilled, which under some Allegory doth express a simple and a received truth: as in this expression; I would advise you to set the Campe in order: the meaning is, I would advise you to prepare for War: such propositions are not to be found fault with; but yet we must take heed of affectation, yea and of lightness too, because gravity doth become an Oratour; though young students may do well to pitch upon the most plain and obvious propositions; and such easie ar-

guments as are moſt pertinent to the matter in hand; and after they can do this tollerably well, they may by degrees aſpire higher.

Secondly, When you have reſolved upon your propoſition, then you are to bethink your ſelf of ſome Arguments by which that propoſition may be confirmed: for *an argument is a probable reaſon brought, to perſwade the Auditours of the truth of the Propoſition.*

I call it *a probable reaſon*, becauſe arguments are of two ſorts; ſome are certain, evident and neceſſary, and theſe are convincing: as, that *Peter is not a beaſt, becauſe he is indued with reaſon*; others are probable carrying with them ſome ſhew of truth; that is, they ſeem to be true either from the general received opinion, or for the ſimilitude that they have with the truth, or from the event; and theſe are the Arguments, which an Oratour ſhould chiefly enquire after; not but that he may alſo uſe ſuch are Demonſtrable and undeniably true: but becauſe he many times hath to doe with ſuch propoſitions as cannot be demonſtrated, or if they can, yet he uſeth probable arguments for the moſt part, becauſe he is to

ſpeak

ſpeake to ſuch, as will be more eaſily perſwaded by ſuch arguments, as come within their own ſphere, which they can eaſily fathom, than by ſuch as are Demonſtrative and beyond their apprehenſion.

Thirdly, in *Invention*, we are to conſider the ſeveral *Topicks* or *common places*, from whence theſe probable Arguments may be invented or raiſed; and theſe are of two ſorts; *Intrinſecal*, and *Extrinſecal*: thoſe are called *Intrinſecal*, which are compriſed in the matter which is propounded of what kind ſoever it be; and all matter is compriſed in one of theſe three kinds of Caſes or Cauſes, *Demonſtrative*, *Deliberative*, and *Judicial*.

The *Demonſtrative Caſe* is ſo called, becauſe it *doth Demonſtrate the Nature of the Subject propounded*. And is uſed either in the *Commendation*, or *Condemnation* of perſons, actions, or things. When it is uſed by way of *commendation*, it is called an *Encomium* or a *Penegyrick*: and when it is uſed by way of *condemnation*, it is called an *Invective*, if againſt ſome *eminent Perſon*, it is called *Philippick*.

The *Deliberative Caſe* is ſo called, *from the deliberation or conſideration that*

ſhould be taken before advice be given.

The *ſubject matter* in *this caſe*, is *every contingent thing*; every thing which is in our own power.

More particularly, if it be a *publick caſe* there are five things in which according to *Ariſtotle*, *deliberation* is required.

1. In publick taxations. 2. In making of War and Peace. 3. In the guarding of Countries. 4. In importation and exportation of goods. 5. In the diſpenſing or not diſpenſing with Laws.

But in *private caſes* the particular matters in which we ſhould deliberate, cannot be aſſigned, beacuſe of the great variety; there being nothing concerning our ſelves or families, in which deliberation is not convenient, if not neceſſary.

The *Judicial caſe* may be ſo called, *from the delivering of our Judgment or opinion of the matter propounded*, whether *for* or *againſt*, whether by way of *Accuſation*, or by way of *Defence*. And the *heads* from whence Arguments may be raiſed in theſe ſeverall kinds of caſes are either ſuch as are *common to them all*; or ſuch as are *peculiar to each kind*: I will here ſpeak of ſuch

generall

general wayes of inventing Arguments from the very matter propounded, as are *common to all three caſes or cauſes*; and they being well underſtood, the Ingenious and Judicious Oratour will need no direction for each ſeverall kind of cauſes in particular.

The *Topicks* or *Heads* for invention in the General are theſe following.

1. *Definition.* 2. *Diviſion.* 3. *Notation.* 4. *Conjugation.* 5. *Genus.* 6. *Species.* 7. *Similitude.* 8. *Diſſimilitude.* 9. *Contraries.* 10. *Oppoſites.* 11. *Compariſon.* 12. *Cauſes.* 13. *Effects.* 14. *Adjuncts.* 15. *Antecedents.* 16. *Conſequents.* All other *Topicks* from whence *Intrinſical* or *Artificial* arguments may be raiſed, are contained in theſe or may be derived from them.

The firſt of theſe Topicks I call *Definition.* And, *Definition is a ſpeech explaining or declaring what a thing is.* The *parts* of a *Definition* according to the Logicians are theſe two 1. The *Genus or general name*; that is, a name that doth agree with the thing defined, and alſo with ſeveral other things beſides. 2. The *Difference or particular name*, that is, a name which doth only agree with that which

is defined; for example, *Man is a living Creature endued with Reaſon.* But ſuch Definitions are ſeldome uſed by Orators, becauſe they afford but little matter for an Oration; but other wayes of Defining things, which may be called Deſcriptions rather, and ſuch are theſe that follow.

One way of *Defining* things, much uſed by Oratours, is, *to deſcribe it by the parts thereof*, which may be ſometimes large and yet elegant: of this way we have an example in *Cauſinus*, who doth deſcribe a *Butterflie* in this manner. "A Butterflie, "ſaith he, is a ſmall Animal, ſeldome ſeen "in Cities but very frequently in the fields; "it is of a full, tender, ſoft, and flexible "body, growing ſmaller and ſmaller to a "little length, on which a diſperſed gentle "down doth neatly ſhine; there ſtand out "as it were extended Horns, ſmall as thrids, "between which a pleaſant light of his "ſhining eyes doth ſparkle; but a ſpecial "wonder is in his Wings, far beyond the "bulk of his little body, they are bedecked "with flowers, adorned with Purple, "ſhine like Gold, and glitter with ſtars; "being poyſed with theſe, he flies as it "were with Oares into the air, diſport-

"ing

"ing himſelf, and cleaving almoſt to every "ſtalke: ſometimes he ſucks the juice of "leaves with his moſt delicate trunk, ſome-"times he ſweetly repoſeth among ſt delight-"full odors, other while with a renewed "flight he ſoars aloft and eſcapes the hands "of inſulting boyes, drawing in the air "ſix hundred Meanders.

A *Second* way by which Oratours do *define* or rather *deſcribe* things, is by ſuch *effects, as do proceed from the four cauſes*, and this way doth as it were open a gate to a large field; only you muſt take heed, that you reckon not every *minute* or *ſmall matter* for an *effect*; according to this way Saint *Ambroſe* doth deſcribe *drunkenneſs* to be an *incentive of madneſs, the fomenter of luſt, and the poyſon to wiſdome.*

A *Third* way is by *ſimilitude*; but not according to the uſual way of expreſſing them, by the particle, *As*: but by bare affirmation omitting the uſual way of compariſon: for example: *What is our life? It is a market in which we buy and ſell; in which one deceiveth another, and in which every one doth mind his own buſineſs; and hath a care of his own wealth: it is a Comedie, in which every one doth act his own part, this man the part of a King, and that of a peaſant.*

A

A *Fourth* way is by *Synonomie*, as thus; *What elſe is a Lilly, but an ornament to the Earth, the glory of Plants, the very eye of Flowers, the Jewel of the meadowes and Star of the Fields, adorning the Earth, as the Stars do Heaven; giving as great a luſter to other flowers, as the Jaſper ſtone doth to Gold, and as much delighting the eye as the Sun the world.*

A *Fifth* way is by thoſe *cauſes* by which *effects* are produced; as the *Material, formal, efficient* and *finall cauſes*. For example, the Edifice which *Dædalus* hath raiſed with his own hand, of ſtrong and hewed ſtone, in a round form, is not only fortified againſt the injury of weather; but hath alſo ſo much gracefullneſs in it, that it eaſeth the mind of all care, yea and filleth it with delight; it is ſo neatly built, that you would think it Heaven upon Earth.

A *Sixth* way is by *negation*; when we firſt ſhew what a thing is not, and then what it is: Thus *Babuſius Lib.* 3. *Epigr.* doth deſcribe a *Friend*.

A Friend *is not a bare voice, or empty nutſhel, but a Friend is known by his affection and behaviour, by his words and actions.*

A

A *Seventh* way is by *adjuncts* and *proprieties*; Thus our *blessed Saviour* is called, *The Assertor of humane liberty, the master of Sanctitie*, and *absolute perfection, the everlasting fountain of all vertues.* Thus *Solomon* is described: *Solomon that great miracle and Oracle of humane Wisdome, the Master or Tutor of the World.*

An *Eighth* way, is first to describe the thing Ironically according to the opinion of some, and then to explain the same, as in truth it is, or at least according to your own thoughts and apprehensions of it.

The *Second Topick* for *Invention* is *Division*, or *Distribution of the matter propounded into its parts*; thus the *life of Man* may be divided, into *Infancy, Childhood, Youth, middle age, old-age.*

Arguments may be raised from the *parts* unto the *whole*, three wayes. 1. By *affirming* that of the *whole*, which may be affirmed of *all the parts*; as if you would prove the *whole Fabrick of a House* to be defective; you may divide the house, into *the walls, the roofe, and floores*; and shew the defects in each of these.

2. By *denying* that of the *whole*, which may be denied of *all the parts*; as if you were

were to ſhew the inconvenience of ſending Children to travell: you may enumerate the ſeveral places adjoyning, and ſhew the inconveniencies that may be in ſending them to any of thoſe places; as ſuppoſe to *France*, *Spain*, or *Italy*, and by conſequence any whither elſe.

3. By making an affirmation *of one particular part*, omitting or rejecting the reſt; as thus, *either he loves me or hates me*, for there is no third or mean; *but he doth not love me, therefore he hates me.*

This Topick may be elegantly uſed by way of *Interrogation*, *Repetition*, *Subjection*, *Preterition*, and *Apoſtrophe*. An example whereof, may be this excellent deſcription of a Garden, as it is ſet forth by *Drexelius* in his *Nicetas*. "There was, ſaith he, a "moſt pleaſant Garden as it were a Para-"diſe, the ſmiling Trees ſtood with their "leaves budded, which with a delightfull "odour made the ſhadows gracefull, the "gentle motion of whoſe boughs made a "ſweet whiſtling noyſe, amongſt theſe a "murmuring Rivulet, clearer than any "Chryſtal, with running ſtreams which did "ſmoothly glide, diſturbing the pible ſtones "with its ſinging waters: ſo that the mo-"tion thereof was almoſt a Muſicall har-"mony.

"mony. On either ſide were flowers,
"with *Zephyrus*'s copious family; on the
"one hand the ſilver Lillies from the green
"bank did ſmile (upon you) on the other
"the purple Roſes did glitter, from an o-
"ther part the Daffidillies white as Snow
"or Ivory, were ſet off with the Hyacinths
"red as blood, yellow as gold; moſt plea-
"ſant gales of wind breathing from every
"part.

The *Third Topick* is *Notation*, or *Etymologie*, which is *the interpretation of the word, ſhewing as well the original thereof, as the ſignification* : as *a Senate* is ſo called becauſe of *convention of the Seniors*, that is of old men. *Etymology* is more frequent amongſt *Grammarians*, than *Orators*, yet ſometimes there may be an occaſion for it amongſt them, even for ornament and ſweetneſs ſake.

The *Fourth Topick* is *Conjugation* : and *Conjugation* is either when *one word hath various endings*, as *Knife, knives*; or when *ſeveral words do come from, or are derived from one primitive*; thus *beautifull* and *beautifullneſs* are both derived from *beauty*. From this Topick we argue thus, *If piety be a commendable quality, then he that is pious is worthy of commendation.*

Conju-

Conjugation and *Notation* differ in this; *Notation explains the word; Conjugation shewes its derivation and various termination.*

The *Fifth* and *Sixth Topicks* are *Genus* and *Species*: now that is called *Genus*, which doth comprehend *ſeveral things* under it which are *really different* from one another. And that is called *Form* or *Species*, which may with other things be referred to *one common Genus*: And thus this word (*Art*) is a *Genus* in reſpect of the ſeven liberal ſciences, as *Grammar*, *Rhetorick*, &c. And theſe ſciences *Grammar*, *Rhetorick*, &c. are the *forms* and *Species* which are contained under this *Genus* or general term (Art.)

The firſt of theſe Topicks namely that which is called *Genus*, doth many times afford the Oratour plenty of matter; for by this meanes a finite propoſition, that is a propoſition that is confined to the circumſtances of time, place and ſuch like, is reduced to an infinite, and hath all thoſe reſtrictions taken from it. From theſe Topicks we may argue two ways.

1. That which is ſpoken of the *Genus* may ſometimes be alſo ſpoken of the *Form* or *Species*; as thus, *if vertue be to be imbraced,*

braced, then Temperance ought to be imbraced also.

2. That which is denied of the *Genus*, may be also denied of the *Species*; as thus, *if no liberal Art be necessary for a Souldier; then Rhetorick is not necessary for him.*

The seventh Topick is *Similitude*; and similitude *is the comparing of two or more things together, which are in themselves diverse, but do agree in some particular.* For Example, *a shadow* and *Glory* are in themselves very different things: but yet they agree in this, that the shadow doth accompany the body, and glory vertue. And hence *Tully* saith, that *Glory is the shadow of vertue. Similitude* may be collected, either from words, actions or fables; nay there is scarce any thing which may not in some particular be compared with another, sometimes it is used for to prove, but most commonly for illustration.

The eighth Topick is *Dissimilitude*; and Dissimilitude *is the disagreeing of two or more things in some particular*; from this Topick we argue thus: that which agreeth with one thing that is unlike, doth not necessarily agree with another; & that which doth not agree with some one thing, may yet agree with

with ſome other particular: For Example, *Idle Citizens care not what miſchief doth befal the Commonwealth; therefore the more generous and publick ſpirited men, muſt endeavour to keep the Republick from danger.*

The ninth Topick is from *Contraries*; and thoſe things are ſaid to be contraries, *which cannot both at the ſame time agree with one and the ſame thing*: thus no man can be ſaid to be wiſe in that thing, in which he is a fool.

Contraries are diſtinguiſhed into *four* ranks or kinds: *Adverſe*, *Privitive*, *Relative* and *Contradictory*; in theſe ſeverall kinds of contraries we are wont to argue either by way of affirmation or by way of negation.

In thoſe *Contraries* which we call *adverſe*, we argue rightly, if we deny that of one thing or perſon, which we affirm of another, as thus; *there is no ſafety in Warre, all men do therefore deſire peace.*

In thoſe *Contraries*, which are *Privative*, we argue rightly, when one privative is denied of that perſon, of which another is affirmed, as thus: *you wiſh me poverty, becauſe you envy my proſperous and wealthy condition.*

In

In *Relative contraries*, we argue rightly, when one is inferred from the relation which it hath unto the other; for example, *if you be a Schollar, pray tell me who is your Maſter.*

In *Contradictory contraries*, we argue rightly, when one being denied, the other is affirmed, or the contrary; as thus, *He is juſt, he is not juſt.*

The tenth Topick is from ſuch things as are *oppoſite* to one another: And they are ſaid to be *oppoſites* to one another, which can never agree together: as *wrath* and *friendſhip*; from which ſort of Topicks, the way of arguing is, to deny that of one oppoſite which is affirmed of the other; as thus, *If* Peter *have a mind to kill* Paul, *ſurely he can have no love for him.*

In the uſe of theſe Topicks we muſt conſider how things that are *contraries*, *unlike* or *oppoſite*, do differ from one another. Thoſe things are ſaid to be *contrary*, which cannot agree with one another; things that are *unlike* doe not diſagree, but are diverſe; but in things that are *oppoſite*, when one of the *contraries* is expreſſed, we are to anſwer it by the *effect* of the other; as thus, *to love* and to *hurt*; for *to hurt* doth proceed from *hatred*, and *hatred* is *contrary unto love.*

The

The eleventh Topick is *Compariſon*, and Compariſon *is the comparing of one thing with another.* This is either *equall* or *unequall.*

Equall compariſon *is*; *when two equall things ar compared together.* As thus; *he hath deceived thee, therefore he will deceive me alſo.*

Unequall compariſon is two waies, firſt when we argue from the greater to the leſs: As, *God ſpared not the Angels that ſinned, how then ſhall he ſpare man?*

Secondly, when we argue from the leſs to the greater: As, *he will not let one ſin go unpuniſhed: much more will he therefore puniſh a multitude of ſins.*

Compariſon doth differ from *Similitude* in *that* two things are compared together in reſpect of ſome third; but in *Similitude* there is no reſpect unto a third, but to one another only: as thus, *It is lawfull for* M. Antony *to defend* Clodius; *why may not* Tully *then defend Milo?* Here the compariſon is between *Tully* and *Anthony*, but it is in reſpect of a third, that is, in reſpect of *Defence.* But in this, *As they that are ſick, thinke all things loathſome, though never ſo ſweet; ſo they that are wicked cannot reliſh the beſt Societies*: Here the *ſick in body* are compared to the *ſick in mind*, that is to the *wicked*, but not in reſpect of a third

hird, but in reſpect of their own corrup-
ed taſtes.

The twelvth Topick is from the *cauſ-*
s of things: And that is ſaid to be *a cauſe,*
from whence a thing may in any ſort be ſaid to
e produced.

We commonly reckon four ſorts of
cauſes, Efficient, Material, Formal and Fi-
nall.

The efficient cauſe is that which maketh a
hing: Thus the Sun cauſeth or maketh the
Day; to this may inſtruments and all other
things be referred, which do only aſſiſt in
the making as well as thoſe which make
the thing: as a Pen is an aſſiſtant in writ-
ing. From this cauſe we argue thus: If the
cauſe be denied, we deny the effect; if the
auſe be granted, we grant the effect al-
ſo: if it be praiſed or diſpraiſed, we praiſe
or diſpraiſe the effect alſo.

The Material cauſe is that of which a thing
is made, or is imployed in; as money of Gold,
and an Oratour about every matter or
thing. From this cauſe we argue thus; If
matter be afforded, there may be ſuch an
effect, and the goodneſs or the badneſs
of the effect depends upon the goodneſs
or the badneſs of the matter.

The

The formal Cauſe is that by which the thing is what it is, or that by which it is diſtinguiſhed from other things. Thus a Ship and a Timber houſe do differ by the diverſe diſpoſing of the parts. In this cauſe we argue from the excellence or the meaneſs of the form; the more excellent the form is, the better is the thing, and any deficiency in the form doth make it the worſe: and every thing ſhould be proportionable to his form: and hence a man ſhould aim at immortal things, becauſe his ſoul (which is his form) is made immortal.

The final cauſe is that for which a thing is made: and the end for which we do any thing, is generally one of theſe three, becauſe it is either honeſt, profitable or delightfull. From this cauſe we argue according to theſe Axiomes. *Such as the end is, ſuch are the things that are done to that end. If the end be good or bad, the things referred to that end are good or bad alſo.*

The thirteenth Topick is from the *Effects*, and thoſe are ſaid to be *Effects which are produced by their cauſes.* From theſe we argue either by inferring the cauſe, the effect being granted, or by denying the cauſe, the effect being denied; or by commending

nending the cause, if the effects be good, or by condemning it, if the effects be bad: nd these heads drawn from the causes and ffects, do afford great plenty of matter or discourse.

The fourteenth Topick is from the *Adjuncts*, and those are said to be adjuncts, *which are joyned with the thing, but not of necessity*; to wit, such as are joyned to persons or things. *Tully* reckons up twelve of the first sort, *viz.* Of the *Person*, as *the Name, the Nature,* quality &c *the Habit, the Fortune, the Life, the Affection, the studies, Councells, Actions, Chances, and Speeches.* The *Adjuncts* of a thing are commonly six. *Place, Time, Occasion, Manner, Faculty*, and *Instrument*; but some there are which do reduce them to these seven.

Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando.

In *English* thus,

First ask, *Who*, *What*, and *Where*; and then,
What Aide, with *Why*, and *How*, and *When.*

Quis, who, doth signifie the quality of the Person, in which there must be considered his

his nature, ſex, age, nation, kindred and eſtate, in reſpect of his body, mind and fortune.

Quid, what, importeth an enquiry after the nature of the thing, as whether it be of importance or not; whether great or ſmall; noble or ignoble.

Ubi, where, denotes the place.

Quibus auxiliis, with what aide, notes an enquiry concerning the perſon, that joyned with him in that action, or other inſtruments by which it was effected.

Cur, why, denotes the finall cauſe, with what intent or to what end it was done.

Quomodo, how, ſhewes the manner of doing it, as namely with what eaſe, or how hardly.

Quando, when, notes the time in which it was done, and this head doth many times afford great plenty of matter.

The fifteenth and the ſixteenth Topicks are the *Antecedents* and the *Conſequents*. Thoſe are called *Antecedents, which go before the thing*; as, *you made him tremble, therefore he is ſenſible.*

They are called *conſequents, which do neceſſarily follow the thing*; as, *he that is thruſt through*

through the heart muſt needs dye. From the *Antecedents* we argue thus. The *Antecedent* being granted, the *conſequent* muſt needs follow; as, *he is wounded in the heart, therefore he will dye.* But from the *Conſequents* we argue thus: If the *conſequent* be affirmed, the *antecedent* is affirmed; as, *It is a great gaſh, therefore it was a great blow that made it*; if the *Conſequent* be denied, the *antecedent* is denied alſo; as, *he is not dead, therefore he is not wounded in the heart.* And theſe are the *Intrinſecal* or *Artificial* Topicks from whence arguments may be raiſed on any Theam or matter propounded. For illuſtration ſake, I will ſhew you, how, from theſe Topicks, a matter for an Oration may be raiſed from this Theam or propoſition, Clodius *laid ſnares for* Milo.

The Praxis.

Every *Theam* or *propoſition* doth conſiſt of three parts, a *Subject*, a *Predicate*, and a *Copula.* That is called the *Subject*, of *which we ſpeak*; The *Predicate*, *that which is ſpoken of the Subject*; and the *Copula is ſome Verbe which joynes the ſubject with the predicate.* In this propoſition *Clodius* is the *Subject*, becauſe it is of him that we are to

ſpeak, *to lay ſnares* is the *predicate*, becauſe that is the thing which is ſaid of *Clodius*.

Now therefore if you would find out arguments on this Subject, Conſider well, which is the *Subject*, and which is the *Predicate* in your propoſition: Then take the *Subject* and go through every Topick: firſt go to *Definition*, and ask what it is, what is the nature of it, and how it is diſtinguiſhed from other things. Then go to *Diviſion*, and ſee into how many parts the *Subject* may be divided; and ſo forward from Topick to Topick. And ſtill obſerve to your ſelf every argument, which doth by this means ariſe from the *Subject*, and applie it to the *Predicate*, ſo ſhall you eaſily ſee, whether it doth fully confirme your propoſition; and when you have done with the *Subject*, take the *Predicate*, and run through the ſeveral Topicks, with that alſo; but if the matter require it, and that you judge it more convenient to take the whole propoſition, than *Subject* and *predicate* apart by themſelves, you may in that manner run through all the heads of *Invention*, but ſtay not too long upon any one, for if matter offer not it ſelf in one head go to another, for every head perhaps may not afford matter,

ter, at leaſt not ſuch as is apt and fit. But if you would know whether your argument or matter be drawn from the *Subject* or the *predicate*, put it into the form of *Syllogiſm*, and if the *Major* be moſt certain, you may couclude, that the argument is drawn from the *Predicate*, but if the *minor* be moſt certaine, it is then drawn from the *Subject*. When you have found your arguments which prove the propoſition, you muſt reduce them alſo into the form of *Syllogiſm*, conſiſting of three propoſitions; The *Major*, *Minor*, and *Concluſion*; and then in the ſame manner as hath been ſhewed, you muſt ſeek out arguments to confirm every propoſition, if need be: to which purpoſe, *Similes*, *Examples*, *Apothegmes*, ſentences and ſuch like are very ſerviceable and ought to be had in readineſs. But for the more eaſie finding out of convenient matter you muſt conſult ſuch bookes which are written upon the ſubject in hand, among the reſt *Polyanthea*, *Theatrum vitæ humanæ*, *Feltham's Reſolves*, and ſuch like.

CHAP. III.

Of the Sharpneſs and ingenuity becoming an Oration.

Such is the Curioſity of this age in which we live, as that it is grown weary of theſe plain and ordinary waies, and requireth or expecteth in the very ſtyle ſomething more than ordinary; inſomuch that now a daies he is not worthy the name of an *Orator*, that knowes not how to brandiſh an Oration, by ſome ſharp and witty flouriſhes. And therefore, that we may comply with the preſent times, we will alſo ſpeak ſomething of that ſharpneſs or ingenuity, with which an oration ſhould be adorned.

And firſt I will ſhew you what is meant by *ſharpneſs* or *ingenuity*: as *Material ſharpneſs* then, is *the meeting of two lines or ſides in one point*: ſo *Metaphorical ſharpneſs is the concourſe, or diſagreeing concord, of the ſubject and the predicate in an Oration.* Or thus, *Sharpneſs is an agreeing diſcord, or a diſagreeing concord*, that is, we are then ſaid

ſaid to ſpeake *ſmartly* or *wittily*, *when the predicate and ſubject of an oration, do agree with one another in one part, and diſagree in another.*

This *ſharpneſs* or *acuteneſs* is threefold, *unnatural*, *præternatural*, or *natural.*

Unnatural ſharpneſs is, when two things agree that are in themſelves unlike, oppoſite and contrary, or any way differing; or when there is a different application of the ſubject and predicate; as thus:

The fire doth ſcorch and burn, and oftimes flame,
Yet ſee, cold blaſts do now come from the ſame.

It is againſt nature that cold ſhould proceed from fire. Yet ſeeing that many by that meanes have defended their chaſtitie, and reſtrained the heat of luſt, it is fitly ſaid, that cold proceeds from fire.

Præternatural ſharpneſs is that, which is not indeed againſt nature, but yet is very unuſual: as, *Martial*:

Deliciæ populi quæ fuerunt Domini.

Natural ſharpneſs is that which doth a-

agree with the nature of the thing ; as *Martial* :

Impenſis vitam Principis annumeres.

It is the Kings grace that you are alive. As if he had ſaid thus, You are beholding to the King for your life ; whereas naturally, it becomes a King to preſerve the lives of his ſubjects.

The beſt of theſe three is that which is called *unnatural*, becauſe it begetteth great admiration.

The wayes by which this *diſagreeing concord* between the *ſubject* and the *predicate* may be made, are chiefly four:

1. By annexing to the ſubject a diſagreeing Epithite ; as, *an innocent ruin: a confuſed order.*

2. By annexing to the ſubject another diſagreeing ſubſtantive. as, *The Sun is a fountain of light.*

3. By a *Catacreſis* either in the *Adjective*, in the *Subſtantive*, or in the *Verb*. Firſt in the *Adjective* ; as, *a brazen forehead*, meaning *ſhameleſs.*

In the *Suſtantive*, as if you call *Almes*, *an holy rain*, or *a golden ſhower of piety.*

In the *Verb*, as thus ; *the waters made*

the

the Souldiers valiant and compelled them to fight: that is they were the more couragious, becauſe being near the Sea it was impoſſible to fly.

4. When the *predicate* is both affirmed and denied of the ſubject in a different ſence; as the Poet ſpeaking of a Virgin that loſt her beauty to preſerve her chaſtity ſaid: *And then ſhe thought her ſelf moſt beautifull, when ſhe had loſt her beauty.*

Matter in which to exemplifie theſe ſeverall wayes of making an agreeing diſcord between the ſubject and the predicate in a propoſition may be had firſt from the Logicall Topicks of *Definition*, *Diviſion*, &c. for there is none of them ſo barren from whence with a little conſideration you may not collect ſomething that is ſmart and ingenious. *Biderm.*

Quid facimus? glaciata gelu ſi Lympha negetur,
Ex oculis hauſtas funus habebit aquas.

What ſhall we do? if th' water be by froſt congeal'd,
Our eyes ſhall water for the funeral yield.

Where he ſheweth that tears are the waters

proper for or becoming funerals. To run through all the Topicks would be tedious, only obſerve, that the chiefe for this matter, are theſe, *Final cauſes*, *effects*, *adjuncts*, *contraries* and *oppoſites*: for hence it will be eaſie to find ſomething conſentaneous and diſſentaneous to the ſubject.

Secondly, *Matter* may be had from ſome *Paradox*, or ſome unuſual ſpeech.

And unto this head may thoſe be reduced, which are drawn from pleaſant jeſts: as,

Firſt from *Metaphors*; as if one ſeeing a horſe with an ill favoured mouth ſhould ſay, *the Horſe laughs.*

2. From a *Paronomaſia*: as, *Eminent men of great note, are now adaies moſt ſubject to imminent dangers.*

3. From the *Etymologie* of the *name*:

4. From ſome rare and pleaſant *ſtory.*

Thirdly, From ſome leſſon of *Morality.*

Fourthly, From ſome *Ambiguous* word.

Fifthly, From ſome *Trope* and *Figure* in Rhetorick, eſpecially from ſome *Metaphor*, *Allegory*, *Catachreſis*, *Metonymie*, *Proſopopœa*, &c.

And now though theſe directions, for the finding out of ſomething in a propoſition

ſition that is ſmart and ingenious are in themſelves good, yet methinks they are not clear and perſpicuous enough; here therefore I will ſet down what *Horatius P. Matthias Sarbievius* hath more plainly expreſt by way of *Praxis*, though much to the ſame purpoſe.

The *firſt Praxis* is, when ſome magnitude, bulk, majeſty, authority, largneſs, or deſtruction is fitly applied to any thing, in a doubtful ſence; and is indifferent whether it be taken really or Morally. Thus *Seneca, Epiſt. 66.* ſaith, *that Scævola being lame and unarmed, made war, and with that lame hand he overcame two Kings.*

The *ſecond Praxis* is the contrary unto this, when a thing is diminiſhed either in quantity, or eſtimation, and in a doubtfull ſence.

The *third Praxis* is when this Sharpneſs doth actually contain the cauſe, or doubtfully inſinuate ſome truth of a contrary effect.

The *fourth Praxis* is from the ambiguity of ſome word or ſentence, as when it doth in truth ſignifie one thing, but it is intended to ſignifie another. Thus when *Julius Montanus* was repeating his verſes,

and having deſcribed the *riſing* of the Sun, and began to deſcribe the manner of his *ſetting*, one of the company would have gone his way; and being asked the reaſon, ſaid, *Could I heare him any longer than from Sunriſe, to Sunſet?*

The *fifth Praxis* is, when that is applied to an inanimate thing, which is proper to a thing that hath life, yet ſo, as that the ſence and meaning is underſtood, by ſome action of the thing of which we ſpeak, being applied to ſomething of a contrary nature. Thus *Pliny* ſpeaking to one, that went to plough, after he had gotten the victory in battaile, ſaith: *The earth rejoyceth to ſhew it ſelf to one that is victorious, and being tilled by a conquerour, ſhe waxeth proud with her early fullneſs of princely fruites.* And thus Saint *Auguſtin* upon theſe words of Chriſt, *I am the true light*, ſaith, *Riſe then thou ſluggard, the way it ſelf doth come unto thee, and rouzeth thee from ſleep, riſe and walk.*

He alſo ſpeaketh acutely, who applieth naturall things to things artificial.

Thus the Poet, of one that had a long noſe, ſaith,

Si tuus ad Solem ſtatuatur naſus, hiante
Ore, bene oſtendet dentibus hora quota eſt.

Hold ope your mouth, your noſe to th' Sun direct,
So will your teeth the hour of th' day detect.

The *Sixt Praxis* is, when that which doth agree with real perſons, is applied to thoſe that are not real. So he in *Plautus*, *Our hands have eyes, and think they ſee.* But this way is moſt pleaſing, when in one and the ſame thing, the application is both true and falſe: ſuch is that of *Auguſtus Cæſar*, when he ſaid, that *he had two nice daughters, which he was compelled to beare with*; the one was *his daughter Julia*; and the other *the common wealth.*

There is yet another way of Inventing that which is ſharp and witty; that is by comparing the matter with the Oratorical heads and Topicks: this may be done *three* wayes.

Firſt, by comparing the matter in hand with every topick ſeverally; by conſidering what the thing is which we are to ſpeak, what the *Parts*, the *Genus*, *Species*, *adjuncts* and

and the reſt. Thus doth that *Prince* of *Roman* Eloquence, deride the conſulſhip of *Vatinius*, by reckoning up the parts of the year in which he was not Conſul: *There happened*, ſaith he, *a wonderfull thing in the year of* Vatinius, *for while he was Conſul, there was neither Spring, nor Autumn, neither Summer nor Winter.*

Secondly, by comparing one head of the matter in hand, with another different head of the ſame thing: as the *definition* of the thing with its *adjuncts*, or of the *effects* with the *Cauſes*. Thus *Valerius Maximus* by comparing the *Material* cauſe with the *Formal*, that is by comparing the body with the ſoul, finds out this ſmart commendation of *Lucretia*: *Lucretia*, ſaith he, *that mirrour of Roman chaſtitie, whoſe manlike courage was by an evil miſtake of fortune, confined to a female body.*

Thirdly, by comparing the Topicks of one order, with other Topicks of the ſame order, as *definition* with *definition*, *cauſe* with *cauſe* &c. as for example, *The King whom* Mutius Scævola *could not conquer by his armed hand, he made to fly, by ſetting his hand on fire.* Here the acuteneſs lies, in comparing of one cauſe with another, that is his armed hand, with his hand in the flames. And thus much concerning *Invention.*

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of Diſpoſition.

DIſpoſition *is the orderly placing of thoſe things which are Invented.* It is wo fold.

Firſt, *Natural*, in which things are diſ-ourſed in that order in which they were done, or in which according to nature, hey ſhould be done: as if you were to com-mend a perſon, you ſhould firſt begin with his childhood, next his youth, and ſo to he other degrees of his age.

The *ſecond* way is *Artificial*, which doth ither for delight, or profit diverſly mingle nd confound the matter, putting that in he end which ſhould be in the beginning, nd the beginning in the end, that ſo he may oth delight the Auditours and hold them n ſuſpence; which in an unexpected event oth not a little pleaſe and delight the earers. Thus doth *Virgil* do in his *Æneades*, in which he ſpeaketh of *Æneas* is voyage into *Italy*, but not in the ſame rder in which he began: thus doth *Bar-*

clay

clay in his *Argenes*, and thus do all that write either Comedies or Tragedies.

The Orator then having reſolved of his propoſition, muſt *firſt* conſider of what Nature it is, whether ſingle or conſiſting of ſeveral parts, and which of the parts ſhould be firſt handled, which next.

Secondly, He muſt chooſe ſome few of the beſt arguments he hath invented, and place ſome ſolid argument in the beginning, thoſe that are leſs forcible in the midſt, reſerving ſtill the beſt and moſt convincing argument for the concluſion; becauſe the Auditor at the firſt being greedy of knowing muſt be prepoſſeſſed and convinced, but in the end he muſt be ſtrongly confirmed and forced.

And the moſt perſwaſive arguments are thoſe, which proceed from the *Definition*, *Diſtrubution*, *Genus*, *Cauſes*, and *Effects* of the thing diſcourſed of, for theſe explain the nature thereof: The leſs forcible arguments are ſuch as are collected from ſome trivial adjuncts and conjectures.

Thirdly, He muſt Logically diſpoſe of theſe reaſons and arguments, firſt into Syllogiſms, and then conſider how to enlarge them in an Oratorical manner.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, He muſt conſider into what parts his Oration ſhould be divided. Concerning the two laſt, I will a little enlarge my ſelf: And

Firſt, of the Logical Diſpoſition of thoſe reaſons and arguments which are invented, by way of Syllogiſms, and the enlarging of thoſe Syllogiſms in an Oratorical manner.

A logical argumentation *is the diſpoſition or explication of the argument, which when it is perfect doth conſiſt of three parts, of which that which is put in the firſt place, Logicians call the* Major, *Rhetoricians the* Propoſition: *That which is put in the ſecond place, philoſophers call the* Minor, *Orators the* Aſſumption: *That which is put in the third place, is by Logicians called the* concluſion, *by Rhetoricians the* complexion *or* inference. And theſe *three propoſitions*, when they are regularly placed, are called a *Syllogiſm*, which muſt be framed from that propoſition, and cauſe or reaſon, which was before invented.

For example, the propoſition was, *That* Clodius *is juſtly put to death: the* Argument or reaſon given for it is, becauſe *he was a treacherous perſon.* Now then form your Syllogiſm thus: Take this cauſe and joyn it with the predicate of your propoſition, ſaying,

ing,

ing, *Every treacherous perſon doth deſerve to be put to death*: and this is your *Major*. Then take the ſubject of your propoſition, and joyn that with the given cauſe and ſay, *Clodius was a treacherous perſon*; and that is your *Minor*: then bring in the propoſition it ſelf, ſaying, *therefore Clodius deſerveth death*, which is the concluſion, and maketh up the whole Syllogiſm. The like may be done in any other; but alwayes, conſider, with what reaſons, examples, ſentences or ſimilitudes your *Major* or *Minor* may be again confirmed, eſpecially if they be in themſelves weak & but probably true; for if they be certain, they are not then to be proved, but handſomely expreſſed. This done, conſider how theſe Syllogiſms may be handled Oratorically; the which beſides many others may be effected nine ſeveral wayes.

The *firſt* and moſt uſual is ſo to place the parts of the Syllogiſm, as Logicians do, that is the *Major* firſt, and the arguments by which it may be proved. The *Minor* next with the arguments for that; And laſtly the *Concluſion*.

Example.

Imagine that ſome King through ambition

ition of raigning had killed his brother Prince; And ſo make this propoſition, *The King ought to be depoſed*; The *Reaſon*, *becauſe he is wicked*: place this Logically thus: *We ought not to endure a wicked man in the Kingdom*; *The King is a wicked man*; *Therefore he is not to be endured in the King dome.* The *Reaſon* of the *Major* is; becauſe otherwiſe we ſhall blemiſh our reputation among forreigners, by whom we have been alwaies eſteemed honourable, and promoters of vertue, but ſhall now be called patrons and ſervants of wickedneſs. The *Reaſon* of the *Minor* is, that he through ambition having deceitfully killed his brother, hath been injurious to nature and to us: This propoſition, may Rhetorically be thus handled.

The *Major*.

Have we the Citizens of N. now at length made ſuch progreſs in the love of wickedneſs, as that we are not aſhamed to ſee the power of our lives and liberties put into the hands of a deſperately wicked perſon? Shall we now any longer honour the Prince in wickedneſs, or wickedneſs in the Prince? till we our ſelves are reckoned among the wicked. The

The *Reaſon* of the *Major*.

Ah woe is me! O Citizens of *N.* Ah th
glory of our name, bought with the bloo
of our Anceſtors, which we have ſo raſh
proſtituted, through our own inadverten
cy! That we who were formerly repute
the patrons of vertue, ſhould now be reck
oned the ſervants of wickedneſs. Wha
will be ſaid by the bordering, what by th
more remote nations? Behold (ſhall the
ſay) the men for whoſe vertuous acts th
world it ſelf was too narrow; who coul
imbrace nothing, nor do any thing, bu
what was contained within, or did no
exceed the bounds of vertue: behol
them now ſo far fallen into naughtineſs
that laying aſide all modeſty, they are no
aſhamed to adore wickedneſs in th
Throne. And what is the guiſe of the re
of the Citizens? What is the reputatio
of the nobles? if by their approbation baſe
neſs doth thus triumph in the higheſt plac
of dignity. Certainly they cannot but lov
wickedneſs, who do not only permit it, bu
alſo honour it.

The *Minor*.

Had our King gloried in a wicked act committed upon one of the meaneſt of his Subjects; he might perhaps have had ſome ſmall pretence for his cruelty, though it had been accompliſhed with bloudy hands.

The *Reaſon* of the *Minor*.

But to be ſo inhumanely enraged againſt the Prince his brother, who was ſetled in the Kindome by our free and generall conſent, what is it but to proclaime a Warre againſt us and nature it ſelf, and by this one impietie, to offend the tribunals of all Nations.

Approbation.

Truly, if we do well, in judging of the day by the morning, we may be no falſe Prophets, in foreſeeing, what kind of *Nero* he will prove to us, who begins to feed his cruelty with the blood of his own relations, and hath there made an entrance to his cruelty, where others have ended theirs. Awake there-

therefore O ye generous progeny of all ver
tue, and if you have any reſpect to your a
baſed name, or the glory of your Nation
depoſe that wicked perſon from th
Throne; let it be heard in the world, let i
be known to all poſterity, that wickedne
might be in the Kingdom, but could no
goe unpuniſhed, no not in the Prince.

2. The *ſecond* way of Rhetoricall argu
ing is to put the *Minor* with the *Reaſon*
thereof in the firſt place, the *Major* nex
and the *Reaſons* thereof, and laſtly the
Concluſion.

Example.

Let the propoſition be the contrary to
the former, Namely, That *the King ought
not to be depoſed, or put to death, for
any hainous offence committed by him.* The
Reaſon is, becauſe in ſo doing, we ſhall
blemiſh our own reputation. Place it
Logically thus. *We who are Citizens ought
not to blemiſh our own reputation; but if we de
poſe the King or put him to death, we ſhall ble
miſh our owne reputation; Therefore we ought
neither to depoſe the King, nor put him to
death.* The *Reaſon* of the *Major* is, Becauſe
Reputation is the publick treaſure, and

noble

noble patrimony of a Common wealth, which we all ought highly to regard. The *Reason* of the *Minor* is, Becauſe that hitherto we have been famous, for that we never did depoſe our Prince or put him to death, and this honour we ſhall now loſe, if we do either.

The *Approbation*, Becauſe our Anceſtors have alſo had wicked Princes; and yet they did let them alone. And this propoſition may be Rhetorically handled in this manner.

The *Minor*.

I Wiſh O Citizens of *N.* that they who through accurſed and diſloyal boldneſſe, have by their cruel ſuffrages decreed to rob the Prince not only of his Throne, but alſo of his life, would but conſider the conſequence of it in after ages: I would have them conſider that our fame ſhall be more ſtained by their raſhneſs, than it could have been by a patient ſubmiſſion to his cruelty.

The *Reaſon* of the *Minor*.

For hitherto it hath been our peculiar honour that our natural Princes, have been

ours

ours, not more by their birth-right than by our affection; neither hath the world ever heard, that our hands have been ſtained with the blood of any of our Princes: which as it is our peculiar honour above other Nations; ſo it ought to be our great ſtudie to continue it. But now if we ſhould lay wicked hands on our Prince, ſhall we not fall headlong from the glory of our reputation? And be with the reſt deſervedly hiſſed at for paracides for ever?

The *Approbation.*

Or, look back upon your Anceſtours, and let it be your care to treàd in their footſteps: Whoſe Kings although they were Heroes, yet they were alſo men, and that they were all of them free from vice, or that none of them did burthen the Throne with wickedneſs, doth ſeem to me unlikely; yet they rather endured the wickedneſs of their Prince, than to make themſelves wicked by depoſing them; and were willing to exceed in ſubmiſſion, rather than in fury.

The *Major* with the *Reason.*

Why then ſhall we degenerate ſoules baniſh our fame? Why ſhall we cruel wretches ſuffer men to hatch cruelty againſt the common-wealth? We who in honour are compelled to have a principall regard unto our glory, as being our publick treaſure, and the moſt noble patrimony of our Kingdome, and ought, one with his armes, and another with his good works, another with Juſtice, another with Clemency ever maintaine it, as the great Magazin of our honour.

Concluſion.

The King hath acted wickedly againſt his brother, let not us act wickedly againſt the King, neither let poſterity deride us, for committing one wickedneſs, to be revenged of another; let us have regard to that proverbial ſpeech of wiſe men, *If a King be good, obey him, if evill, endure his wickedneſs with patience.*

The *Third* way of arguing Rhetorically is to put the *Concluſion* in the firſt place with the *Major* or *Minor* added thereunto, by the particles, *for, therefore, for this cauſe,*

cauſe, &c. And if any argument follow ſometimes we find the concluſion repeated and ſometimes not: but if the Oration be ſhort, as moſt of our common orations are, the Concluſion is repeated at laſt, but in other words.

Example.

In a *Gratulatory ſpeech* for ſome kindneſs received: of which the *propoſition* is *I owe you many thankes*: The *Reaſon*, *Becauſe you have given me a preferment, and have paſſed by others who were my competitors.*

Place it Logically thus: *He who hath gotten a preferment from one who hath paſſed by others his competitors, he oweth the Donor many thanks; But I have gotten ſuch a preferment. Therefore*, &c. Rhetorically thus:

Beginning with the *Concluſion.*

Moſt gracious Soveraign, The thanks which I owe unto your Majeſty, for the preferment, which you have beſtowed upon me, are ſuch as cannot be expreſſed by words, much leſs can they ever be requited by me: and I am neceſſarily enforced to take up the words before your moſt gracious Majeſty, which

which *Socrates* once uſed to *Plato*; who when he had nothing to give him which was anſwerable to his kindneſs cried out, O Plato *accept of* Socrates. And ſeeing your kindneſſes to me have far tranſcended them of *Plato* to *Socrates*, and alſo that I my ſelf cannot be a recompence ſufficient for the kindneſs of a King, I do here devote my ſelf and all that I have to your Majeſty in token of gratitude.

The *Major*.

Ought not he to account himſelf highly engaged to obedience, on whom the King of his own mere inclination, hath conferred that honour, which many near him have in vain expected, and for which many have in vain petitioned?

The *Reaſon* of the *Major*.

Certainly his favour is heightened by the expectations and petitions of others, and one bounty becometh two when he that hath it, is adorned with a much deſired honour, and in being thus adorned is preferred before all his Competitors. It is not unknown to any, what men, how much deſerving of

your Majeſty, and of their countrey, have made great ſuite for this dignity both by themſelves & others; with whom, if I ſhould come in competition, I could be hardly any way compared: but your moſt gracious Majeſty, moſt bountifully ſupplying the imperfections of my actions with your own benigne charity, hath alwaies looked upon me, as one that hath devoted himſelf to you, and the Common-wealth.

The *Concluſion* repeated.

What ſhall I now promiſe, but earneſtly to endeavour that you may never have occaſion to think, that you have placed your kindneſs on an ungratefull ſoul? I do therefore moſt humbly lay down my ſelf and my endeavours, all that I have, and all their endeavours, at your Majeſties feet, to be ordered according to your will and pleaſure: be pleaſed to command us, and you ſhall find our lives to be of leſs value to us than your injunctions.

The *Fourth* way of Arguing Rhetorically is to put the *Major* with the *Reaſons* thereof in the firſt place; Secondly the *Concluſion*, and Thirdly the *Minor*: Fourthly,

it ſeem neceſſary, the *Concluſion* may be repeated in other words.

Example.

If you would congratulate the arrival of ſome Kings Ambaſſador, or any great Perſon: you may make this propoſition: *We ought to rejoyce in your coming to us*: The *Reaſon*; *Becauſe you are a great perſon.* Place it Logically thus: *We ought to rejoyce, at the coming of a great Perſon. But you are a great perſon. Therefore*, &c. Rhetorically thus, beginning with the *Major.*

The ſtars cannot appear without rejoycing the inanimate world; nor great perſons without affecting the ſouls of men, *N. N.* Nature hath given them this, that they cannot be, but they muſt be profitable.

The *Reaſon* of the *Major.*

Vertue hath impoſed this moſt beautifull neceſſitie, That great men can be no where, but where they may ſhew favour and clemency to thoſe that are under them.

The *Concluſion.*

Would to God you might this day ſee thorowly into all our ſouls, yea even of *Momus*, you might there behold Love and Fear, Joy and Sorrow, deſire and eloquence, wreſtling together in our hearts, with no ordinary conflict: for when we ſalute you as our great Gueſt we cannot well tell, whether our fear ſhould love, or our love fear your Excellencie; whether our joy ſhould ſorrow its ſtraitneſs, or our ſorrow joy your appearance; whether our deſires ſhould ſpeak, or our Eloquence wiſh: Oh that we were wholly joy, wholly love, wholly deſire, wholly Eloquence, that we might here in your preſence, expreſſe our affections towards you as we ought.

The *Minor* with the *Approbation* thereof.

The truth is, that not only the Nobleneſs of your birth, ſingular wiſdome, ſweet cariage, and behaviour, and your other ineſtimable vertues, do make you great in our eyes: but we alſo reverence your greatneſſe, becauſe you are ſo in the judgment of the

the whole Kingdome; which having thoſe beames of honour on your perſon, hath publiſhed to the world, that you are her Starr. Our King hath greatly eſteemed you in making you not only of his privy Councell, but Arbitrator of it, when he hath again and again declared you worthy to accompany him, not only in *Germany* and *Britain*, but even in all the parts of his own Kingdome, that you might here and every where, be eſteemed great. And all our borders will for ever owne your greatneſs, becauſe you have condeſcended to ſhew your illuſtrious preſence and noble ſoul in our mean confines: all of us being ſenſible, that great men do augment their greatneſs by their condeſcentions.

The *Fift* way of arguing Rhetorically.

Sometimes the *Major* is omitted, and the *Reaſon* of the *Major* with its *Approbation* is put in its place; Then the *Concluſion*; afterward the *Minor* with the proof thereof, and laſtly the concluſion is repeated.

Example.

Let the propoſition be: *You ought not*

greatly to lament the death of your friends. The *Reaſon* is: *becauſe death is a common evill*: place it Logically thus: *We ought not greatly to lament a common evill; but the Death of our freinds is a common evill; Therefore* &c. The *Reaſon* of the *Major* is, *becauſe a common evill cannot be eſchewed*; you may handle it Rhetorically thus.

Wiſe men do agree that what cannot be avoided, ought patiently to be endured.

The *Approbation*: That ſo in not feeling it, it may appear to us, as if it did not particularly concern us.

The *Concluſion*: We then do certainly ill, to give our ſelves over to grief for the departure of our friends, and in ſome ſort to bury our joy, in the ſame grave with them.

The *Minor*.

For this evil doth not concern, aſſalt, or befall one onely perſon; but it conerns all alike, it overfloweth all.

The *Reaſon* of the *Minor*.

For all things on which we live, whoſe life we enjoy, in the uſe of which we are delighted, are bound to the ſame Condition, are all ſubject unto death.

Confir-

Confirmation. Morover our ſoul doth inhabit but an infirm and weak cottage, which doth in it ſelf conſiſt of adverſe and contrary elements, and from without it ſelf, is aſſalted with many and great dangers. To which purpoſe *Seneca* ſaith well, *that we are deceived, when we look on our death, as if it were to come; a great part thereof is paſt, and this very time which we live is death.*

The *Concluſion* repeated:

Divide then that grief among all men, which you have engroſſed to your ſelf from the common bitterneſs of fortune; we all run the ſame fate, and muſt all endure it; think not then that you do well, in giving your ſelf up to too much to grief.

The *Sixt* way.

Oftimes the *Major* is omitted, and the *Minor* onely with the *Approbation* thereof, and the *Concluſion*, are mentioned. This argumentation is called an *Enthymem*, of which the firſt part is called the *Antecedent*, the other the *conſequent*. And you may place them as you pleaſe, the *Antecedent* firſt and then the *Conſequent*, or on the contrary.

Example.

Let the propoſition be: *Youths are not to be bridled with rigid diſcipline.* The *Reaſon*: *Becauſe they are not the better for rigour, but the worſe.* Omitting the *Major*, place it Logically thus: *Youths are worſe for the rigour of diſcipline, therefore they ought not to be kept under a rigid Diſcipline.* Oratorically thus.

You erre greatly if you think that a youth may be improved by ſeverity and fear of diſcipline; for though they may by an auſtere carriage ſeem to be reclaimed, yet really and indeed, they become thereby the more diſſolute: Go to experience, and you ſhall find them, to be commonly the worſt of all others, who have paſſed their youth under the moſt ſevere diſcipline. As a torrent may for a while be ſtopped by an overthwart bank, but while it ſtops, it is but gathering its more ſtrong ſloud, by which when the bank is broken, it doth redeem the length of its ceſſation, with its more raging flux: ſo youth being bridled under cruel preſſures, after it is once freed from thoſe lawes by wich it was reſtrained, it doth become the more violently inſolent; and drowneth the Soul

in

in the purſuite of thoſe Syren ſnares from which it was before debarred: for we alwaies deſire forbidden fruit, and to enjoy what we cannot obtain. This diſeaſe of the ſoul is beſt cured by indulgence: for as *Ovid* excellently deſcribes ſuch tempers.

Quod licet ingratum eſt, quod non licet acrius urit.

——————— *Ipſa poteſtas*
Semina nequitiæ languidiora facit.

We loath what's lawfull, what not, we deſire.
The power of doing, doth put out the fire.

The *Seventh* way.

Cicero directeth *Herennius*, firſt to place the *expoſition* or the thing to be proved; Secondly the *Reaſon* or *Reaſons*; Thirdly the *Approbation*: Fourthly the *exornation* or *illuſtration*, from the Contrary, or from Example, Similitude, Teſtimony or Sentences &c. Fiftly the *Complexon* in which all is ſummed up; this is the moſt eaſie way, and moſt fit for extemporary ſpeeches.

Example.

Let the propoſition be: *A little knavery and wantoneſs doth not hurt a youth.* The *Reaſons. Becauſe they cannot preſently be thereupon accounted bad.* For a man cannot be alwayes good; And the cleareſt day hath ſome clouds: The *Approbation. And thoſe who are now old men, were wanton when they were young.* The *Exornation* from *Teſtimony*: A certain Poet ſaid, *He depriveth the year of the Spring, who would not permit a youth to be wanton.* From *Sentences*; *And every age ought to have that behaviour, which is moſt agreeable thereunto.* From the *Contrary. It is unſeemly for an old man to behave himſelf like a youth: Therefore it is alſo unſeemly for a youth to behave himſelf like an old man.* From *Similitude*; *For if Ale be not mad when it is new, it is never good when it is ſtale.* This you may handle Rhetorically thus.

Expoſition. What great matter is it if a youth be ſomewhat waggiſh, for a little while? The *Reaſons*: Do the *Spaniards* therefore drink water, becauſe they temper their Wine? or doth one fair day make a Summer?

mer? And what man is wiſe at all times? The cleareſt day hath ever had ſome clouds. Why do we then ſo ſcrutinouſly reprehend the very leaſt fault in a youth, and (if I may ſpeek freely) all that leudneſs in them, which in our ſelves we called but waggery. What if they Crown the ſtreets with their friendly concourſe, or pull one another by the hair in jeſt; or weary their armes with a kind Wreſtling, and are not alwayes among the prophets, not alwayes toiling at their bookes, but ſometimes give themſelves to dancing, laughing, and jeſting; what other things, I ſay, are theſe but the ſports of youth; and keeping themſelves in action, till age and experience, lead them to more noble imployments. Unleſs then they diſguiſe their faces like melancholy perſons, unleſs their eyes be for ever condemned to the Earth that they may there tell all the ſtones and atoms of duſt, unleſs they hang their heads upon their ſhoulders, and become devotionary ghoſts; they muſt be thought worthy of baniſhment to *Gyarus* and *Thale*.

The *Comprobation*.

Oh rigid *Catos*, fit to be Judges of *Manlius*'s laws, either you have forgotten your own youth, or you might from the former

former indulgencies of your own folly, learn to connive for a while at ours; neither durſt you by violating the priviledges of our youth accuſe nature when (as the Poet ſaith well) *to deprive youth of their waggery, is to deprive the year of its Spring.*

From *Teſtimonies*:

Every age hath its proper limits; and it is as neceſſary that the behaviour of perſons ſhould be ſuiteable to their years, as for garments to be fitted for the body.

From the *Contrary*.

And if we may deride a youthfull old man, why may we not by the ſame rule deteſt the behaviour of the aged in thoſe that are young? And what cruelty is it in the morning of age to exact the noondaies gravity, and when the twilight of wiſedome doth ſcarcely appeare, you require the ſageneſs of the perfect day. You give your Horſes, and Bullocks liberty, to exerciſe their irregular caperings; and are you ſo blind, that what you ſee to be naturall in other creatures, you cannot ſee to be ſo in your owne children. And (that I may ſpeak with all mildneſs) be pleaſed at leaſt to take a ſober draught of this truth,

even

even out of a Barrel of Ale; unleſs the Ale when it is new do fill the Aire, the Cellar, the barrell, with a malepert hurly burly; it will when it is old be neither healthful for the bodie, nor pleaſing to the Palate. And hence an exhortation might be made, to take well and beare with the wantonneſs of youth.

The *Eighth* way of arguing Rhetorically.

The *Eighth* way is by *Induction*; now Induction *is a ſpeech, which from undoubted premiſes, doth inferr ſome one concluſion.*

In this we muſt obſerve *two* things.

Firſt, That the things premiſed be certain.

Secondly, That what is inferred have ſome reſemblance to the things premiſed. This way of arguing is moſt familiar unto an Oratour, and doth moſt excellently ſet forth a matter. *Cauſinus* ſaith, *it ſweetly inſtills matter, and is in proving delightfull:* and if the things inferred be many, it affords a large field for diſcourſe.

Example.

Let the propoſition be this. *A man ſhould be commended from what he is, and not from*

from what he hath. The *Reaſon* is, *becauſe a Ship, and a Sword, and a ſquare are commended from what they are, and not from the ornaments that they have.* *Seneca* doth thus handle it Rhetorically.

We call not that a good Ship which is painted with curious colours or which hath a gilded head, or a ſtern overlaid with Ivory, or which is loaded with the riches or revenues of Kings; but that which is ſtable, ſtrong and ſound, to bear through the raging Billowes of the Sea, which is eaſily governed by the Helm, is able to beare a gale of wind, and is withall a nimble ſayler. We call not that a good ſword which hath an embroidered belt or a ſcabbard ſet with Jewells, but which hath a ſharp edge and point, to hew in peices all that ſtandeth in its way. The goodneſs of a thing is not in its beauty, but in its fitneſs for that uſe for which it properly is. Therefore in a man alſo we are not to regard how much he ploweth, how much he lets out on uſury, by how many he is courted, in how magnificent a bed he lieth, in how rich a Cup he drinketh, but how good he is in himſelf *&c.*

To this way doth that alſo of the *Scythian* Ambaſſadours in *Quintus Curtius* appertain,

tain, proving to *Alexander*, that he ought not too much to truſt to his greatneſs and fortitude, by an Induction thus: *What*, ſay they, *know you not that great trees grow along time, and in an hour are cut down: he is a fool that covets the fruite and conſidereth not the height of the tree, on which it growes: the Lyon hath ſometime been the food of ſmall birds; and ruſt doth conſume the ſtrongeſt ſteel: there is nothing ſecure from being deſtroyed, even by the moſt contemptible inſtrument.*

The *Ninth* way of arguing Rhetorically, is to argue from *Example*.

Now an Example *is an imperfect Induction, or arguing from one Similitude to another.* And is done *two* waies eſpecially.

Firſt, Explaining a thing by a *Protaſis* and an *Apodaſis*; ſo this propoſition, *A Generall ſhould be a lover of learning, as* Julius Cæſar *was*, is thus handled. The more famous that *Julius Cæſar* was in his victories, the more did he exerciſe his learning; and with the ſame hands he ſcattered thoſe Palmes in his Books, with which he won them from his enemies. Who then

then can deny, but learning is well becoming the moſt warlike Prince or Emperour? Nay if he deſpiſe not the beſt counſell that can be given him, if he mean to arrive to the perfect perfection of a good Prince, he will labour for learning with all his might, &c.

Secondly, We argue from *Example*, when after the relation we preſently add ſome reaſons, either by way of approbation or diſallowance, as we are wont to do in other parts of the oration; but after the reaſons given we apply the thing to the matter in hand, ſhewing in what it doth or doth not agree. This daily practice is very antient; but obſerve that the uſe of *Examples* is very graceful (and the ſame may be ſaid of *Sentences*, *Apothegmes*, *Hieroglypicks*, &c.) when by that either in the beginning or in other parts of the Oration we expreſs the ſame thing, which we ſhould otherwiſe have done in our own words.

For Example, I would ſay: O ye Judges ye ought to take heed, that ye aſcend not the Tribunal for hope of reward: I would do this by Example; *Agathocles*, when he went to give Judgment, was wont to ſay, *Let us go to a Golden harveſt.*

Then

Then I would add the reaſon which I ſhould have added to my propoſition, namely it is a wicked thing to endeavour to grow rich by other mens wickedneſs.

Afterwards I would more fully prove and enlarg it. Or inſtead of this example, I might have uſed this ſentence: They that are intruſted with the government of the common wealth, ſhould not go to the adminiſtration of Juſtice, as thoſe that go into a Faire or market. And to this ſentence, may be added ſome reaſons and arguments to prove the reaſonableneſs of that aſſertion. But you muſt be alwaies careſull, that the example or ſentence may beare the ſame ſence with the thing, that is in that place to be explained.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of the parts in an Oration.

WHen by the former directions you have put the invented matter, into a certain order; then consider of how many parts your Oration shall consist. *Tully* tells us that an Oration ought generally to consists of these five parts.

1. *Exordium.*
2. *Proposition.*
3. *Narration.*
4. *Confirmation.*
5. *Peroration.*

As for *Confutation* it is comprised in *Confirmation.* But all these parts, are not always necessary; for the ingenious Orator may as he shall see it convenient, sometimes omit the *Narration*, somtimes the *Exordium*, sometimes the *Peroration* or *Conclusion*, yea & the *Confirmation* is many times scarce discernible; as when the things propounde

pounded are certain, there is more need of ornament than proof, as in Gratulatory Orations and the like. As for the placing of these parts, their natural order is that in which we have named them 1. The *Exordium*, 2. The *Proposition*, 3. The *Narration*, if it be not thought fit to omit it. 4. The *Confirmation*; and lastly the *Peroration*.

Of each of these I will here set down some few directions; and first for *Exordiums*.

An Exordium *is as it were the door of the Oration, in which the Orator doth prepare the minds of the Auditors for that which is to follow*: and this is commonly done by one of these *three* waies; *by bespeaking their favour*; *by making them docible*; or *by begging their attention*. The favour of the Auditors is bespoke either from the person of the Orator, from the persons of the Auditors, from the persons of the Adversaries, or from the subject matter of the discourse. The Orator may bespeake the favour of the Auditors, in respect of himself, if his gesture and deportment be suitable unto theirs that are his Auditors, and express himself modestly. And in respect of the Auditors, if he shew how well they have deserved

of

of the Common wealth, of him, and o
ther men. And in reſpect of the Adverſa
ries, if he modeſtly ſhew wherein they ar
faulty and render them to the Auditors in
excuſable. And laſtly in reſpect of th
matter in hand, if he ſay, that it is ſom
excellent, neceſſary and profitable thing.

Secondly, the Orator may be ſaid t
make the Auditors docible, if he clearl
explain the thing of which he is to ſpeak
and how he purpoſeth to enlarge upon it

Thirdly, the Attention will be quickne
if he ſaith, that he intends to ſpeak of ſom
great and wonderfull thing, and ſom
thing that is delightful, neceſſary, and
very much concerns his Auditors, *&c.*.

An *Exordium* may be ſaid to be faulty
or not ſo commendable. *Firſt*, if it be vulga
or common, that is, ſuch as may be uſed in
many if not in all caſes. *Secondly*, if it be long
and tedious, not proportionable to the length
of the Oration. *Thirdly*, if it conſiſt of ſom
different matter, not ſuitable to the othe
parts of the Oration. *Fourthly* if it effec
not that which is required or expected.

And that is ſaid to be a good *Exordium*
which is neate and elegant, fit for the
purpoſe, making the Auditor docible and
well affected, and from which the acceſs

to

o the propoſition is not violent and for-
ed, but eaſie and agreable. Though *Tully*
loth very much inſiſt on this, that all *Ex-*
rdiums ſhould be ſuch, as will afford an
aſie and proper acceſs unto the propo-
ition; yet practice which is the beſt maſter,
nd a diligent obſerving, what manner of
Exordiums others make to their Orations,
vill afford the beſt directions; but yet
Rhetoricians are wont to preſcribe ſome
ertain formes according to which, begin-
ers may exerciſe themſelves in framing
heir *Exordiums* aright: the chiefeſt of them
re theſe following.

They firſt way.

Firſt, propound ſome propoſition or pro-
aſis, by which an eaſie acceſs may be
made to the propoſed matter. *Secondly*, Add
ſome Reaſon or Confirmation, to which if
you will ſome refutation may be annexed,
for he that confirmeth truths, hath alſo the
liberty to refute falſhoods. *Thirdly*, Add
ſome confirmation of the reaſon. *Fourthly*,
make ſome particular inference or concluſi-
on, to which ſome reaſon may be alſo ad-
ded, and thence an acceſs to the propoſiton.

Example.

Let the propoſition be this. *I will (before you my Auditors) defend my good name which wicked men have hurt.* To this you may make your entrance thus. *There is nothing which Malice doth not violate, nothing which it will not gnaw with the teeth of ſlander, or make nauſeous with the black venome of contumelious ſarcaſmes. To this baſe work it hath not a little advantage by the ill nature of this age wherein we live, in which men are ſo unmanly, as not only to contemn the works of vertue, but even to oppreſs what ever is done by the rules of honeſty; if otherwiſe they cannot, they will at leaſt do it with a miſt of ſcurrilous and ſcoffing langnage. And ſhall not we at laſt, by our indulgence to vice ſo much increaſe the family of* Momus, *as that in the end, we ſhall all be aſhamed of honeſty: if we can even yet tamely behold and ſuffer the moſt wicked crime to be committed with applauſe and led in triumph, and virtues to be condemned to baniſhment, nay to flouts and hatred. I have been unwilling to be the firſt raker in this kennell, but the ſtorm which hath again and again beat upon my head with renewed waves, hath quite wearied my patience, and*

nd I doubt that I ſhall wrong good men in any nger ſparing the bad. For now they do not vade my fortunes, which in it ſelfe were a iſerable thing, they do not raze my walls and uſes which were miſchievous enough, ey do not gape after my life and ſafe-, which were more than inhumane; but aving ſet upon my good name, my honour and putation, which is to a good man far dearer an his life, they ſtrive to overwhelm this ith whole burthens of reproaches. Therefore at this audaciouſneſs of wicked fellowes, ay be by you moſt prudent Auditors at once ppreſſed, be courteous to me this day, and ndidly hear what I have to ſay for my lf.

The ſecond way.

Firſt underſtand the propoſition well, f which you intend to ſpeake, then draw om thence ſome general reaſon, which ay contain the moſt material thing in the ropoſition; then amplifie, and adorn this eaſon, with *Sentences*, *Examples*, *Simili-udes*, &c. then bring in the propoſition it lf, as ſome particular aſſumption of that eneral diſcourſe.

For

For Example, ſuppoſe you were to make an *Exordium* to a funerall Oration, upon the death of ſome noble man, according to theſe directions, you might perform it in this manner.

"This is a leſſon ſo well known to all "that all muſt die, that he would ſurely be "thought to be beſide himſelf that ſhould "but think himſelf immortal. For men "alas! like running waters may not al "waies continue in one place: one da "thruſts out another, one yeare devoureth "another, and one wave overwhelmeth "another: And like as earthen veſſels are "quickly broken and eaſily ſhivered into "many pieces; ſo are our bodies ſoon "diſſolved, and quickly reduced to earth "from whence we were taken; we may be "killed with too much joy, we may be op "preſſed with too much ſorrow, we "may die praying and fall down laugh "ing; we may be throttled with a hair "or ſtrangled with a flie. And thus "on a ſudden we are and we are not "alive to day and dead to morrow, and "every hour we haſten nearer and neare "our end. There needs no other or fur "ther teſtimony to prove the aſſertion, than "that the many inſtances of mortalit

" which ſo daily and ſo hourly happen that
" it is hard to turn our eyes from them; yea
" even this ſad occaſion of our preſent
" meeting ſhews us, that whatſoever dif-
" ference there is or may be in our way of
" living, in this there is none, in this we
" are equall, the certain uncertainty of our
" dying: If either wealth or honour, if ei-
" ther Friends, or Phyſick could vanquiſh
" death, or prevent the grave, we had not
" met this day to lament the death of this
" Honourable perſon; we had not ſeen this
" ſpectacle of mortality, but death alas re-
" ſpects no perſons, will have no denyal un-
" to his ſummons, whether it be in the even-
" ing of our dayes, when our hoary haires
" may ſeem to proclaim us as fit for his
" ſtroak, as the corn is for the ſickle, when
" white for the Harveſt; or whether he
" come in the morning of our life,
" when our bones are full of marrow
" and our bloud runs briskly in our veines,
" which is his caſe whoſe funerall obſequies
" we are now to perform. As a green
" Apple is ſometimes rudely pulled from
" off that tree on which it grew, ſo was
" this branch cut down, before he had
" lived one half of the age of man. He
" was indeed born of noble and unſpotted

"Parents, but as if that wiſedome were "not tied to years, his diſcretion did a- "dorn his birth more, than his birth "him, &c.

The third way.

Firſt, Propound ſome opinion contrary to your own, either with or without a reaſon for it. Then *Secondly*, Deliver your own opinion, with a reaſon or two, or without any reaſon alſo. *Thirdly*, Deliver the contrary reaſon, if it ſhall be neceſſary, and ſo come to your propoſition; that is, propound ſomething in your preceding words, from whence you may inferre your propoſition either plainly, or obſcurely. Let the propoſition, for example, be: *Wiſdome is moſt ſuteable to Noble men*: That you may deduce this, firſt lay down the contrary opinion, namely, *There are many think that Wiſdom becometh none but common people.* The *Reaſon* of this contrary opinon. *Becauſe Noble men are born for the Warrs, not for the Schools, and have their commendations from their eſtates.* Your own proper opinion: *This is an evill opinion and to be confuted.* The *Reaſon* and anſwer to this contrary

trary opinion. *Becauſe it is miſchievous to the world.* Acceſs to your propoſition. *I will therefore ſhew that Wiſdom is moſt proper for a Noble man.*

The *Topicks* or heads from whence matter for an *Exordium* may beſt be had, the moſt famous Rhetoricians have reduced unto theſe.

Firſt, *An enumeration of cauſes*, when the Oratour ſhewes the cauſes which moved him to ſpeak: as if he were to commned ſome Noble perſon; he might begin his *Exordium* thus: *You need not wonder that I ſhould ſpeak in the commendation of this worthy perſon; theſe reaſons have induced me* (and here lay down the reaſons) *Therefore I ſhall ſpeake*, &c.

Secondly, *The Adjuncts of the Perſon*, either of the Orator himſelf, or of the Auditor, or of him of whom you are to ſpeak:

Example of the firſt.

If you were to praiſe ſome body, you might thus begin. *To expreſs the juſt praiſes of this perſon, there ſhould be indeed a more skilfull Orator than my ſelfe, but yet I thought my ſelfe obliged thereto, not only for my affection to him, but alſo to expreſſe my gratitude, for the many favours which I have received from him.*

Example of the ſecond.

Although my weakneſs might command me ſilence, yet courteous Auditors, the wonted candor which you have ſhewed to others doth both invite and encourage me to ſpeak; Therefore &c.

Example of the third.

Though the things to be commended in this perſon, are ſo many and ſo great, that they would require a Demoſthenes *or a* Tully *to ſet forth his worth; yet I will endeavour,* &c.

Thirdly, *The Adjuncts of place.* Example; *If I had conſidered the dignity of this place, I ſhould not have undertaken, to ſpeak unto you this day* (and here ſhew the Reaſons) *but I conſidered more your humanity, and the neceſſity of the thing; and therefore.* &c.

Fourthly, *The Adjuncts of Time*; as thus: *The time requires, that I ſhould ſpeak this day unto you,* (here ſhew the reaſons.)

Fiftly, *The Adjuncts of perſon, time, manner and place together.*

Sixthly, *The opinions and affections of men,* for men do either rejoyce, or are ſad, or angry, *&c.* And according to theſe or the like paſſions or affections you may find matter for an *Exordium.*

Seventhly,

Seventhly, *Some passions with which the Oratour himself may be affected*, as anger or grief or admiration, or gratitude, &c.

Eighthly, *The difficulty of the thing of which you are to speake.*

Ninthly, *Contradiction or Accusation:* Example; if you would contradict another, you may say; *I like not this mans opinion, because*, &c. and here shew the reasons. If you would accuse another you may say: *It is not for ill will to you or any mind to do mischief which hath perswaded me to accuse you, but the love I have to the common, for Justice sake, and for necessity.*

Tenthly, *Preterition*; as thus: *I could speak of many things, but because I will not tire you with them, I will only mention one or two.*

Eleventhly, You may find matter for an Exordium, *from what hath either been said or done before*; as if you were to accuse some person, you may say: *This is not the first time that this person hath been thus accused, found guilty, and yet born with, but now it cannot be sure thought fit, that he should be born with any longer.*

Twelvthly, *Comparing and opposing opinions and persons:* as suppose you were to

ſpeak for peace; you migh ſay: *Many are for War and ſhedding of blood; But I believe that we can have no greater bleſſing than the bleſſing of Peace.* Or if you would compare perſons, you may do it thus: *Some worthy and learned men have heretofore ſpoken of this ſubject, with whom I am in no wiſe to be compared; but becauſe the matter concernes the Common wealth, I alſo will ſpeake freely,* &c. This for *Exordiums.*

The ſecond part of an oration is the *Propoſition.* And the *Propoſition* is that part of the Oration in which the Orator doth briefly deliver the ſumme of the whole matter of which he intends to ſpeak, and beſpeaks the hearers attention if need be. Sometimes it doth immediately follow the *Exordium*; ſometimes it follows the *Narration*; in what place ſoever it be put, it muſt be ſhort and clear, and fit for *Confirmation.*

And here it is to be obſerved firſt, that a *Propoſition* may de delivered two waies.

Firſt, *Openly*, when the Orator doth plainly declare the matter of which he meanes to ſpeak.

Secondly, *Darkly*, when the matter of his Oration is ſufficiently known before hand, or may eaſily be diſcerned from the content, or when the thing to be proved is not laid down

down as a distinct part from the *Exordium*, but is insinuated as a member thereof annexed, and further to be proved afterwards.

Secondly, it is to be observed, that when a proposition is longer than usual, it ought to be divided into certain parts, that so the Orator may the more fully explain the matter, and the Auditor the better remember it.

Narration is another part of an Oration, by which a relation is made of the matter or thing done. And this is either a distinct part of the Oration, and then for the most part it doth immediately follow the *Exordium*, that the *Proposition* with the *Confirmation* thereof may be collected from it. Or else it is joyned with the *Confirmation*, which is to be done in such Orations which assume the explanation of the thing done to prove the matter in hand; for example: *if you were to prove that some valiant person, had been a Souldier in some warre; it is necessary that you should declare, what the particular actions were, in which he shewed his valour.*

But now in that Narration which is made a distinct part of the Oration, the thing done must be briefly and simply declared without any exaggeration: and in such a

Narration as makes way for confirmation, the things done may be illuſtrated, with great neatneſs of language with ſentences and figures; & ſome diſcourſes may be made concerning the worthineſs of the action, with ſome amplification from ſimilitudes and compariſons: In a word, where ever you make a *Protaſis* from any Hiſtory or Fable, and afterwards make an application thereof, there you muſt make your *Narration*, and this may be in any part of the Oration, even in the *Exordium*: but theſe kinds of *Narrations* are moſt uſefull in ſuch Orations as are in commendation or diſcommendation of perſons, in which it is neceſſary to declare their vertues or their vices.

That your *Narration* may be ſuch as it ought, you muſt obſerve,

Firſt, that the known matter muſt be briefely declared; the matter unknown more largely.

Secondly, that there be in it ſome apt ſentences, and that it expreſs the manners of men, as their pride, covetouſneſs, and the like; and to this purpoſe an *Hypotypoſis*, or *proſopopœa* and ſuch like figures are uſefull, to wit, when ſome perſons are introduced in their melancholy or ſtudious mood,

mood, or ſpeaking ſomething which doth declare and manifeſt what their natural inclinations are.

Thirdly, that it be plain & clear. And that it may be ſo, you muſt avoid all circumlocutions, the reckoning up of a multitude of things, and making large Catalogues of perſons, with frequent and long perentheſes and uſeleſs digreſſions.

Fourthly, that it be probable. And that it may be ſo, you muſt have a care, that the circumſtances of time, manners, place and perſon be all ſuteable; beſides ſome teſtimonies may be briefly named, unleſs the perſon from whom the *Narration* is made be well known, and of good credit. But if any thing be mentioned, not altogether probable, ſome admoniſhment muſt be made thereof, either by adding the cauſe, as, *a Covetous man throwes away his wealth becauſe he ſaw his life in danger*; or, *a Fox deſpiſeth grapes, becauſe they are out of his reach.* Or by confeſſing the improbability, if no defence can otherwiſe be made, and that either plainly thus; *It is wonderfull if we may believe the Poets*: or with ſome compenſation thus; *It is ſtrang, but yet it is true*: or by naming ſome witneſſes thus; *I know not the reaſon, but thus it is affirmed by very ſober*

men. Or by desiring the Auditors that they would at present admit the thing, which afterwards you will prove more fully.

Fiftly, that all the things declared, may ctend to the end propounded and that the onfirmation may easily follow thereupon. Moreover in declaring any thing let the Orator chiefly observe, the persons, matter, time, place, manner, and cause, which do almost happen in all cases; but yet all these circumstances are not alwayes necessary to be expressed, but as many of them only, as the Oratour in his discretion shall think fit.

The Fourth part of an Oration is *Confirmation*; and *Confirmation* is as it were the very heart and soul by which an Oration may be chiefly said to live: or it is the chief part of an Oration in which the arguments are produced by which we would prove our proposition, & refute or answer the contrary opinion of our adversary, if need require. What is necessary in this behalf, may be collected from what hath been already said. Seeing that *Confirmation* doth consist of the arguments that are invented, and the right disposition of them, both which have been fully enough declared before. Thus much only I will adde, that the Orator in *Confirmation* may do well to remember,

ber, *First*, to name thoſe Arguments in the beginning of his *Confirmation*, and alſo in the concluſion which carry with them the greateſt weight, and thoſe of leaſt concernment in the midſt. *Secondly*, to take care, that his Oration may ſtill gather ſtrength; and this will be done, if the following words be ſtill more ſignificant than the former; and that the affections be moſt moved in the very cloſe thereof. *Thirdly*, let him take care, that all his Arguments doe fully prove his propoſition. *Fourthly*, that he urge not his arguments in one and the ſame manner and forme, but that he uſe variety of figures, and propound them ſometimes by way of *Syllogiſm*, ſometimes in an *Enthymem*, ſometimes ommitting the *Major*, ſometimes the *Concluſion*, as he thinks it moſt convenient. *Fiftly*, let him find out the *Crinomenon*, uſe fit *Tranſitions Sentences*, *Digreſſions* and *Amplifications*. And the *Crinomenon* is that propoſition in the Argumentation, whether General or Particular, in which the whole ſtrength doth lie, and that being proved, the whole matter ſeemeth to be proved alſo: this therefore the Orator muſt eſpecially declare and confirme.

Here then obſerve, 1. That the *Crino-*

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menon is ſometimes the ſame with the propoſition of the whole Oration; and then the greater varietie of arguments may be found to prove the propoſition. *For Example*, let the propoſition be this; *I will ſhew you that a King ought to love his ſubjects and the Common wealth.* The firſt argument is; *Becauſe the head ought to love the members; The King is the head, the ſubjects are the members:* Therefore *&c.* The ſecond Argument is; *Every one ought to love his patrimony. The common wealth is the Kings patrimony*: Therefore *&c.* Here you ſee that ſeverall arguments may be brought to confirm the propoſition, becauſe the *Crinomenon* is the ſame with the general propoſition of the Oration.

Note 2. That the *Crinomenon* is ſometimes different from the Generall propoſition in the Oration, and then there is but one principal argument in the whole Oration, which we muſt endeavour to confirme and amplifie. Moreover this *Crinomenon* may be diſcovered, if you put your principal Arguments into a true Syllogiſticall form; for the *Minor* in the ſyllogiſm is ſometimes the *Crinomenon*, as in the firſt argument of the Oration, which *Tully* made for *Milo. He that is a Traitor deſerves tobe kill'd*, Claudius *was a Traitor*

Traitor: Therefore; where the *Major* is certainly true, the *Minor* only is to be proved; this therefore *Tully* endeavours to do throughout that whole Oration.

Sometimes the *Major* is the *Crinomenon*, as *Tully* in his Oration for *Sextus Roſcius*. *No Son would kill his father, but for ſome great cauſe*; Sextus Roſcius *is a ſon*: Therefore. In this Syllogiſm the *Minor* is undoubtedly true, and therefore the *Major* only is to be proved, for in that is the whole force. Sometimes the *Crinomenon* is in the *Major* and *Minor* both. For example, *He killed Roſcius that was advantaged by his death: but the death of Roſcius was advantagious to Capiton*; Therefore. Here the *Major* and the *Minor* are both to be proved. In the reading therefore, and in the compoſing of Orations, the *Crinomenon* muſt be regarded. But when the General propoſition hath ſeveral parts, there are ſeveral *Crinomenons* to be regarded.

2. As for *Tranſitions*, it is by them that the arguments for confirmation have a dependance on one another, yea and the ſeveral parts of the Oration alſo. And a *Tranſition* is a kind of ſpeech by which we expreſs what hath been ſaid in few words, and briefly ſhew what yet remaineth to be ſpoken. It is either *perfect* or *imperfect*. That

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is a *perfect Tranſition* which repeats the things ſpoken, and infers the things that are to be ſaid: as if you ſhould ſay; *Enough hath been ſaid concerning the neceſſity of Arms; let us now ſee what advantage may come from them.* An *imperfect Tranſition* is when we do not revoke the things that are ſpoken, but only proceed to the things that are to be ſpoken, with theſe or the like expreſſions. *But now, furthermore, adde to this,* and ſuch like. And note alſo that one argument doth then properly follow another, when in the end of one argument, ſuch a ſence thereof is given, as will eaſily open a way of ſpeaking and arguing further.

3. Sometimes the Orator may declare the argument by way of *Sentence*, and this may be twofold, *plain* or *obſcure*.

A *plain Sentence* is the declaration of the truth in few words. Or, it is an univerſal ſpeech concerning the good that is to be done, and the evil that is to be eſchewed; concerning God, religion, providence, and other things belonging to the life and manners of men. For example;

Nemo mortalium omnibus horis ſapit;
No man is wiſe at all times.

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An *obſcure ſentence* is a particular ſpeech deducted from a general, the circumſtances of perſons, time and place being added thereunto; as thus; *It cannot be*, O Peter, *that thou ſhouldeſt be always wiſe.*

Theſe *Occult ſentences* are to be very frequently uſed in any part of an Oration, for they do adorn it much, and are very taking with the Auditors: *Plain ſentences* may be alſo uſed, but theſe do beſt become old men and ſuch as have experience; and are chiefly to be uſed in grave matters.

4. *Digreſſions* are oft times and very gracefully uſed in *Confirmation*: in which ſomething is touched upon, which ſeemeth little to the purpoſe, but yet doth ſerve to illuſtrate the matter in hand. And this may be done either *briefly*, and then there needeth no *tranſition*; or elſe *more largely*, and then the Orator muſt recall himſelf, as from a long and a by-path to his preſent purpoſe.

The Orator may uſe *Digreſſions*, when he is to ſpeak of univerſal and common things, as, of vices, virtues, ſlavery, liberty, life, death and ſuch like.

As ſuppoſe one were to prove, that it were not fit to thruſt a learned man out of a City, he might make his digreſſion on the praiſe of learning, ſhewing as well the neceſ-

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ſity as the profit of it. Expoſitions of things done and deſcriptions of places, perſons, cuſtoms and ſuch like, may be handſomely uſed in *digreſſions*.

5. *Amplification* is a ſpeech, which doth augment that, which being nakedly related would ſeem ſmall and trivial, by deſcribing of it by adjuncts and circumſtances. It is twofold, of *words* and *things*.

Amplification of words, is that by which the matter is augmented by the choice of words, and manner of ſpeech. And a *ſpeech* may be augmented from one word ſeveral ways.

1. By the addition of fit Epithites; thus *Tully* doth amplifie and enlarge this one word *War* ſaying, that it is *an horrible and a villainous war, and full of all wickedneſs*.

2. By the uſe of ſuteable Adverbs; as, *you may juſtly and deſervedly praiſe him*.

3. By definition or diſcription; as, *the hands of wicked and pernicious men*, inſtead *of murtherers*.

4. By Notation; as, *the golden mouthed* Chriſoſtom.

5. Synonomies, when many expreſſions are uſed which carry the ſame ſence; as, *this conjunction of minds, this conſpiring together in one, this moſt pleaſant ſociety of life*, inſtead

in ſtead of *friendſhip*.

6. By Paraphraſe; as, *this ſaying of the common people he minded us of a long time ſince*, in ſtead of this, *it is a common ſaying*; or thus, *it was that ſeaſon of the year when the earth puts on her moſt gorgeous apparel to entertain the ſun*, for, *it was in the ſpring*.

7. By Enumeration of parts, when the parts are expreſſed inſtead of the whole; as, inſtead of ſaying, *this valley is ſet forth with all the imbelliſhments that low ground is capable of*, one may ſay: *The rich fields of corn and green meadows lie in ſeveral diviſions interchequered like great beds of flowers, and freſh glaſs pots in a large garden. The corn-fields look as if the roots which were hid in them complained, that by miſtake of their own ſtrength, though a great deſire of being fruitful, they had ſent forth more ſtalks than they could well ſupport, and the overladen ears encreaſed that oppreſſion; the ſweet graſs grew up ſo thick in the meadows, that it ſeemed to be ſtraightned for want of room, and yet crouded cloſer to make way for thoſe fragrant flowers of all ſorts which grew up with it; and theſe mingling their various colours as they beſt fitted the ſeveral greens which they found there, made a ſhew like a rich carpet, where graſs was the ground, rarely made up with beautiful Embroideries of flowerwork.*

8. By

8. By the commemoration of cauſes, o the antecedents and conſequents of thing as: *Thou haſt done what thou canſt to deſtr this city with the ſword, and with arms, a with the terror of an army, and the wickedne of Conſuls, and by beſieging the moſt fortifi Temples, by prepoſſeſſing the Judges, by overa ing the Courts of Judicature, at home and broad.*

Amplification of things is, when the ma ter it ſelf is encreaſed and confirmed wit grave ſentences: yet it is formed indifferent ly from the ſame places from whence the a guments are taken, ſeeing there are many de finitions or deſcriptions of one and the ſam thing: as hiſtory is the witneſs of times, th light of truth, the memory of faſhions, th meſſenger of antiquity, the miſtreſs of beha viour.

2. When many conſequences are reckon ed up; *i. e.* thoſe things which may pre ſently or hereafter follow: as if the propoſiti on were; *Many miſchiefs may follow for wan of due conſideration.*

This may be amplified in this manner *What are the conſequences of inconſideration By this means the opportunity of advancement neglected, the preſent poſſeſſion of goods is utter ly loſt, together with our own lives and the com*

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non ſafety of all.

3. When many cauſes are reckoned up: as if the propoſition were this; *Never do that of which you ſhall have cauſe to repent you afterwards.* Which may be amplified in this manner.

When you do that which is to be lamented, you act inconſiderately, than which there is nothing more fooliſh: you are overcome with paſſion, than which there is nothing more imprudent: you foreſee not what may follow, than which there is nothing more dangerous: you reſtrain not your unruly luſts, than which there is nothing more indecent.

4. When many effects are reckoned up; as, let the propoſition be, Antonius *did the Romans many miſchiefs.* Which may be thus Amplified. *The Romans bewail the loſs of three armies, which* Antonius *deſtroyed. They ſtand in need of wiſe men, and thoſe* Antonius *hath deprived them of. Their Authority and reputation is much weakened and impaired, and that they may thank* Antonius *for.*

5. When many ſimilitudes are brought: for example ſake, let this be the propoſition. *If ſmall faults be not corrected, they will hardly be mended when they are greater.* Which you may amplifie in this manner: *Extinguiſh thoſe ſparks of wickedneſs, unleſs you purpoſe to*

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be consumed; stop up those fountains, unless you mean to be overflowed with those violent waters; take Physick in time, if you fear the approach of some mortal disease. For as fire which is kindled by small embers, doth many times destroy whole Cities: as a River is by the droppings of small springs increased to such a heap of waters as overfloweth the whole land: as light distempers do occasion great diseases, and sweep away whole families: so the vices of young men, unless they be timely suppressed, will be more and more rooted in them, until they have bereft their minds of all vertue and common honesty.

Confutation is a part or kind of *Confirmation*, in which we answer all objections: it doth either preceed or follow *confirmation*, or may be here and there used in all the parts of the Oration. And these objections may be either all answered together, or those first, which are first made, and then the latter; or those first which are most material, and the rest may fall of themselves; or the weakest first, that they being avoided, the strongest arguments may be somewhat weakned. And the manner of doing this, is by shewing, that the Adversaries allegation is either false, impossible, uncertain, or impertinent and the like: and because this part of an Oration is full of heat, and sometimes

imes of fury, it doth admit of *Dialogiſms* r conferences, *Ironies*, *illuſions*, *interrogati-ns*, *execrations*, and other like vehement fi-ures and affections.

Theſe objections are ſometimes rejected ith great ſcorn, ſometimes eluded not ſo uch by ſtrength of argument, as by voice nd geſture.

The Adverſary is ſometimes vexed with hiding; ſometimes preſſed with Queſti-ns, and the dint of all his arguments ſome-imes blunted with the like objections: ometimes there is no anſwer given to hat which he requireth of us; ſometimes he anſwer is not given preſently, but firſt uſpended for a long time.

Peroration or *Concluſion* is the laſt part of n Oration, in which the Orator ſhould ve-y much endeavour to ſet an edge in the minds of his Auditors, and incline them to be of his ſide; and here he ſhould therefore uſe ſuch figures, as are moſt proper to move the affections; it doth chiefly conſiſt of two parts, *Enumeration* and *Amplification*.

Enumeration is required, that the chief arguments more largely opened in the for-mer diſcourſe may be briefly and clearly re-peated in a new form of words. *Amplifica-*

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tion desires, that this repetition may be made, by some serious expressions, adorned with sentences and figures. This part of the Oration ought therefore to be more exactly composed; because by this the Orator is commonly the more or less valued; for this the Auditors do best remember, and from hence do pass their judgments of us.

CHAP. VI.

Of Elocution.

OF all the parts of Rhetorick, *Elocution* in my judgment is the most excellent, for that it is but to little purpose to have a good *invention*, and an excellent way of *methodizing* or disposing of arguments, unless we can also express them in apt and fitting words, and handsomely adorn them with *Tropes* and *Figures*. In the wording therefore of an Oration care must be had, that the words thereof be first plain and significant, and then neat and elegant, and hence this part

rt of *Rhetorick* may be thus defined.

Elocution or the garniſhing of ſpeech, is an *t by which the ſpeech is beautified with the e-* *gancy of words and ſentences.*

And this is performed two ways, by the ne manner of words called a *Trope*, or by e fine frame of ſpeech called a *Figure.*

A Trope *is ſuch an Elocution or manner of* *eech, as doth change the ſignification of a word* *to a different ſignification from the natural.*

In a *Trope* two things are to be conſide-ed.

1. *The Affections.* 2. *The Kinds.*

he *Affections* of a Trope are 4. { *Catachreſis* *Hyperbole* *Metalepſis* *Allegoria.*

Catachreſis *is a harſh and unpleaſant change* *f a word*; as namely when one word or ame is put for another, not by any proper elation, but by a kind of force. *He threa-ens me a good turn.* Enoch *was tranſlated, hat he ſhould not ſee death.*

Hyperbole *is a very falſe relation of a thing,* *r a more bold exceſs of a Trope, which doth ex-ted belief, either by augmentation or by dimi-nution.* Note, that though an *Hyperbole* doth

vary

vary from the truth, yet doth it not deceive us through fiction or such variation.

An *Hyperbole* is twofold { *Auxesis*, or *Meiosis*.

An *Auxesis* is, when *for augmentation sake or Amplification, we interpose a more vehement expression, in his proper place*; as when we say *Magnificent* for *Liberal*, *Cruel* for *Severe*, *Sacrilegious* for *Wicked*.

A *Meiosis*, or a *Tapinosis* is when *for extenuation sake we use a milder or more favourable expression, than the matter requireth*: as when we say a *Flatterer* is a *courteous and an affable person*.

A Metalepsis *is that which conteineth many Tropes in one expression*; as when we by an improper speech, signifie, first that which is improper, and by that improper speech perhaps another, and so forward till we come to that which is proper, making way for transition by interposing a mean degree; as *All the City was moved*. Math. 21. 10. where the *City* is put for *Jerusalem*, by *Synecdoche Generis*: and *Jerusalem* for *its inhabitants*, by a *Metonymy of the subject*.

An ALLEGORY *is the continuation of a Trope, as where many Tropes of the same kind*

kind are joyned together: as, put on the whole armour of God. Ephes. 6. 11. *He shall be as a Tree planted by the rivers of water.* Psalm. 1.

In an *Allegory* observe to end with the same kind of Trope with which you begin, or else the inconsequence will be absurd.

The several kinds of *Tropes* are these four.

1. *A Metonymy.*
2. *An Irony.*
3. *A Metaphore*, and
4. *A Synechdoche.*

A Metonymy *is a Trope of the Cause to the effect, of the subject to the adjunct: and the contrary, of the effect to the cause, or of the adjunct to the subject.*

4. There are four kinds of *Causes.*

1. The *Efficient cause*, by which a thing is.
2. The *Material cause*, of which a thing is made.
3. The *Formal cause*, by which a thing is what it is.
4. The *Final cause*, for which a thing is: of which the two first only belong to our present purpose.

A *Metonymy of the Cause* is twofold, that is, of the *Efficient* or of the *Material Cause.*

A *Metonymy of the efficient Cause* is, when

the Author or inventor of any thing is put for those things which they have effected, or of which he is Author, as *Mars* for *war*, *Vulcan* for *fire*, *Neptune* for the *Sea*, *Ceres* for *bread*, *Bacchus* for *wine*, *Venus* for *love*, *Livie* for the *History written by Livie*, *Virgil* for the *poems or works composed by Virgil*.

And thus the *instrument* is also put for the *thing effected by it*. As the *tongue* for *speech*, the *hand* for *writing*, the *sword* for *slaughter*, *Arms* for *war*.

A *Metonymy of the Material Cause* is, when the name of the matter is put for the effect; as *Brass* for *brass mony*, *Silver* for *Silver mony*, *Gold* for *gold coin*: *they worshipped wood and stone*; i. e. Idols made of wood and stone: *the iron entered into his soul*, i. e. fetters.

A *Metonymy of the effect* is, when the efficient cause is signified by the effects: as *Victory* is by nature *proud and insolent*; that is, it maketh men proud and insolent. *Pale death*; which, *maketh pale*.

Note. That is called the effect which dependeth upon the efficient cause.

Thus *Wickedness* is put for the ungodly [illegible]r of wicked actions, the *work* for the

[illegible] Quas

Quas meruit pœnas jam dedit illud opus.
The work hath received that punishment which it did deserve; that is *Ovid* the Author of the work.

A Metonymy of the Subject is, when the proper name of any subject is made to signifie the adjunct.

Note. That is said to be a Subject, in which a thing may be any way said to be or adhere.

There may be *a Metonymy of the subject* these nine several ways.

1. When a Subject is put for an inherent accident; as, *Curii* for *Victory*, *Curius* being the name of a certain victorious Captain.

2. When the thing conteining is put for the conteined. As the *Cup* for the *drink* in the Cup, the *purse* for the *mony*.

3. When the place is put for the inhabitants; as, The *City* for the *Citizens*. *They smote the city with the sword*, i. e. the men in it.

4. When the place is put for the things done in the place; as, *Psal.* 68. 29. *Because of thy Temple at Jerusalem*; where by Temple is understood the holy exercises and divine worship used in the Temple.

5. When the poſſeſſor is put for the thing poſſeſſed by him; as, *Joel*, 3. 20. *Judah ſhall be inhabited for ever*: where *Judah* the Son of *Jacob* is put for the Land of *Jury*, which was promiſed to his poſterity and by them poſſeſſed.

6. When the Captain is put for his army; as, *Annibal is conquered*, that is, *Annibal's* army.

7. When a Patron or advocate is put for his client; as, *The cauſe will go againſt the Attorney General*, that is, againſt his client.

8. When a thing which is done in time is put for the time in which it was done; as, *Harveſt* for *Summer*, *Job*. 32. 7. *I ſaid days ſhould ſpeak, and multitude of years ſhould teach wiſdom*, i. e, the aged who have ſeen many days.

9. When the name of the thing ſignified is put for the ſign; as, *Ovid. Faſt*: 1. *verſ.* 201.

Juppiter anguſta vix totus ſtabat in æde:
Inque Jovis dextra fictile fulmen erat.
In narrow court, Jove *could ſcarce upright ſtand,*
And held an earthen thunderbolt in's hand.

Virg. Eclog. 3.

Orpheaq;

Orpheaq; in medio poſuit, ſylvaſq; ſequentes.
In the midſt he ſet Orpheus *and the woods following*, that is, the carved images of *Orpheus* and the woods.

A Metonymy of the adjunct is, when the adjunct is put for the ſubject. *Gen.* 31. 53. *Jacob ſware by the fear of his father* Iſaac, i. e. by God whom *Iſaac* feared.

There may be *a Metonymy of the adjunct* eight ſeveral ways.

1. When the names of vertues are put for good men, of vices for wicked, and of many other things for the perſons to whom they belong, or to whom they may be called Adjuncts; as, *on this ſide modeſty contendeth, impudence on that*; where modeſty is put for modeſt men, and impudence for impudent men.

2. When the thing conteined is put for the thing conteining; as, *Pſal.* 11. 7. *The righteous Lord loveth righteouſneſs*, i. e. righteous men.

3. When the adjunct of the time is put for the ſubject. Thus the *night* is put for *ſleep*, which is uſually taken in the night. *Epheſ.* 5. 16. *The days are evil*, i. e. the hearts and converſations of the men of theſe days are evil.

4. When the Sign is put for the thing ſignified; as, The *Scepter* for the *Kingdome*, a *gown* for *peace*, *Arms* for *war*.

5. When the thing placed is put for the place it ſelf: *we ſought thee in all bookſ*, that is, in bookſellers ſhops.

6. When the Antecedent is put for the conſequent; as, *pray hear*, meaning, pray obſerve.

7. When the conſequent is put for the antecedent; as, *He is buried*, inſtead of, he is dead.

8. When one Concomitant is put for another; as, *Annibal ſtaid there*, that is the Army of *Annibal*.

An Irony is a Trope from one oppoſite to another; or, *in which we ſpeak by contraries*.

An *Irony* may be perceived three ways 1. by the manner of pronunciation; 2. by the perſon; 3. by the nature of the thing: for if any of theſe do differ from the words, it is clear, that the intention doth differ from them alſo.

Oppoſites are of two ſorts, { *Unlike*, or *Contrary*.

All things of different natures are ſaid to be unlike: as, *A man*, *a Stone*, *a Book*, *a Dog*; and

and therefore one particular thing, may be equally oppoſed to many things.

All things are ſaid to be contrary to one another that are of contrary natures: as *light* and *darkneſs*, *heat* and *cold*: and therefore one particular thing may be equally oppoſed to another particular.

An Irony of a thing unlike is, when any thing is ſpoken of one perſon and underſtood of another: whether it be affirmed of both, or denyed of one, as, *Virgil Eclog.* 3.

Tum credo cum me arbuſtum videre Myconis,
Atque malâ vites incidere falce novellas.

Sure 'twas when I in Mycon's *ground was took,*
Pruning his vines with an unwelcome hook.

Where *Menalcas* naming himſelf means *Dametas.*

Denied of one, as, *Ovid Metam.* 13.

Nec in his quiſquam damnatus & exul.
None of theſe were either hanged or baniſhed.

Where *Ulyſſes* accuſing *Ajax* tells him that none of his kindred were either hanged or baniſhed; thereby intimating that ſome of *Ajax*'s generation were, to wit,

his father *Telamon*, and his Uncle *Peleus*, for killing of *Phocas*.

An Irony from the contrary is, when one contrary is ſignified by another; as,

O Salve bene vir curâſti probe.
O thou art an honeſt man, thou haſt done very well:

meaning that he was a very rogue and had been very careleſs.

Paralepſis *is a kind of Irony, by which we ſeem to paſs by or take no notice of ſuch things which yet we ſtrictly obſerve and remember.*

The forms of this figure are theſe; *I let paſs, I am ſilent, I omit, I will leave out, I ſay not* &c. as thus, *I ſay nothing of your licentious life, inceſtuous marriage, or your being perjured in ſuch a cauſe*, &c. Where in a kind of elegancy we ſeem to paſs by thoſe crimes, which we do more eminently remember.

Apophaſis *is a kind of Irony, by which we deny to ſay or do, which yet we ſpeak with greateſt earneſtneſs, and do with all our might*; as, *nor will I mention theſe things, which if I ſhould, you could not I am ſure, deny them.* This figure differs from the former, in nothing but the manner of ſpeaking.

A Metaphore *is a Trope by which we expreſs our ſelves by a word, which is of like ſignification, with that we mean.* There is nothing in the world, of which there is not another thing to which it may be reſembled; and therefore there is nothing from whence a *Metaphore* may not be deducted; as, *Princeps caput Rei-publicæ, The King is the head of the common wealth.*

There are eight ſort of things eſpecially, from which a *Metaphore* may be deduced.

1. From ſacred and holy things; as, *One man is a God to another.*

2. From the Heavens; as, *Virgil the ſun of Poets.*

3. From the Elements; as, *The fire of envy; the flood of eloquence and Rhetorick.*

4. From Meteors; as, *The lightning of an Oration.*

5. From Minerals; as, *Golden ages; an Iron breaſt.*

6. From Vegetables; as, *The flower of nobility.*

7. From living creatures; as, *England is the eye of Iſlands; Orators do bark not ſpeak.*

8. From Artificial things; as, *Appion is the Cymbal of the world,* ſo called for his much talking.

And hence are theſe expreſſions, *To file a writing, to poliſh an oration, to rip or unſow friendſhip.*

Synecdoche *is a Trope, by which a part is put for the whole and the contrary*; i. e. *the whole is put for a part.*

A *part* is twofold. { A *Member*, or A *Species*.

A Synecdoche of a Member is, when by a member the whole is ſignified. As the *Roof* for the *houſe*, the *ſwords point* for the *ſword it ſelf*, a *General* for his *Army*, the *ſoul* for a *man*.

Thus the ſingular number is put for the plural; as, *The Roman was victor in battel*, meaning the army of the Romans.

Note. That the ſingular number is a part or member of the plural, not a diſtinct nature: eſpecially conſidering that every multitude doth conſiſt of unities, as of ſo many particulars.

A Synecdoche of the Species is, when the *Species* is put for the *Genus*; as, when *Ariſtides* is put for a *juſt man*, *Crœſus* for a *rich man*.

Thus we put an infinite number for a great number; as, *you may bring ſix hundred*

dred ſuch; Six hundred, one ſpecies or ſort of a great number, for a great number in the general.

A Synecdoche of the whole is, when the whole is put for a part.

The whole is either an { *Integer*, or / *A Genus*.

A Synecdoche of an Integer is, when an Integer is put for a member; as, *His Army was ſo great as that it drank the rivers dry*: meaning a great part of the water in the rivers.

Thus the plural number is put for the ſingular; as, *Cicero* to *Brutus*; *we deceived the people and ſeemed Orators*: When the Orator ſpake of himſelf only.

A Synecdoche of the Genus is, when the General is put for the Special; as, *a man* for *Catiline*, *Vertue* for *fortitude*, *Poet* for *Homer* or *Virgil*, *Orator* for *Demoſthenes* or *Tully*. *Mark.* 16. 15. *Preach the Goſpel to every creature*: meaning mankind only, and not any other creature.

Hitherto of *Tropes* the firſt kind of elocution; the ſecond kind of elocution is by *Figure*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

A Figure *is a kind of Elocution by which the form of a ſpeech is changed from its right and plain uſe.*

A Figure is either of { A *Word*, or / A *Sentence.*

A Figure of a word is that, by which an Oration or ſpeech is compoſed of words aptly and ſweetly ſuitable to one another. And this conſiſts either in the *Dimenſion* or *Repetition of ſounds or words.*

A Figure in the Dimenſion of ſounds is the ſweet number of ſounds in a ſentence.

Number is either *Poetical* or *Oratorical.*

A Poetical number is that, which is confined to a perpetual obſervation of certain ſpaces.

A Number Poetical is either *Rhyme* or *Meter.*

Rhyme is a poetical number containing a certain number of feet, without any regard to the quantity of the Syllables whether long or ſhort. But here many times there

there are ſeveral ſentences joyned together in which the laſt Syllables are like; as,

Dare to be true: nothing can need a lie:
A fault that needs it moſt, grows two thereby.

A Meter is a poetical number conſiſting of certain feet, of which the laſt foot hath the laſt Syllable indifferent or common, that is, long or ſhort.

In this kind of Poetical number, there is a liberty granted for a certain *Metaplaſm* or transformation of a word, namely when there is ſomething wanting in it, or when there is too much, or when there is ſomething changed.

There are four kinds of *Metaplaſms*.

1. By Eliſion or taking away ſomething from the end of a word, in the ſcanning of a verſe.

And this is either, *Synalæpha* or *Ecthlipſis*.

Synalæpha is an eliſion or ſtriking out of one vowel before another in divers words; as, *'tis*, for *it is*.

Ecthlipſis is when the letter *m* with his vowel is taken away, becauſe the word following beginneth with a vowel; as, *Syncer' eſt*, for *Syncerum eſt*.

2. The ſecond kind of *Metaplaſm* is by adding

adding ſomething to, or deducting ſomething from a word: and of this there are ſix kinds.

Proſtheſis, *Aphæreſis*, *Epentheſis*, *Syncope*, *Paragoge*, and *Apocope*.

Proſtheſis is the adding of a letter or Syllable to the beginning of a word.

Aphæreſis is the taking away of a letter or a Syllable from the beginning of a word.

Epentheſis is the putting of a letter or Syllable into the middle of a word.

Syncope is the taking away of a letter or Syllable from the middle of a word,

Paragoge is the putting of a letter or ſyllable to the end of a word.

Apocope is the taking of a letter or ſyllable from the end of a word.

3. The third kind of *Metaplaſms* is by dividing and contracting of words, the one is called *Diæreſis*, the other *Synæreſis*.

Diæreſis is that which maketh two ſyllables of one.

Synæreſis is the contracting of two ſyllables into one.

4. The fourth kind of *Metaplaſms* is by changing ſomething in a word, and of this there are five kinds. *Tmeſis*, *Metatheſis*, *Antitheſis*, *Diaſtole* and *Syſtole*.

Tmeſis is that which divides the parts of a com-

compound or ſimple word by putting another word between them.

Metatheſis is the tranſpoſition or miſplacing of a letter in a word.

Antitheſis is the putting of one letter for another.

Diaſtole is that which maketh a ſhort ſyllable long.

Syſtole is that which maketh a long ſyllable ſhort.

Oratorical number doth indeed conſiſt of feet, but not of any certain number of feet, but of as many or as few as the Orator pleaſeth. And although for teſtimony or delight he may ſometimes recite the verſes of others, yet muſt he not make verſes, when he writeth proſe. He ſhould not make the beginning or the end of a verſe to be either the beginning or end of proſe. But a greater care is to be had of the cloſe than either of the beginning or middle of a ſpeech, for in that the perfection of number doth chiefly appear; but theſe things will be better underſtood by the practice of the meaneſt Orator, than the precepts of the moſt skilful.

What the *Figure of a word* is, in the *Dimenſion of the ſound thereof*, hath been ſhewed: now followeth the *Figure of a word* in reſpect of the *repetition* thereof.

And

And this is twofold, *Like*, or *Unlike*.

A Figure of a word in the repetition of like ſound is either *with* or *without intermiſſion*.

Repetition of like ſound *without intermiſſion* is either an *Epizeuxis* or an *Anadiploſis*.

An *Epizeuxis* is, when a like ſound is repeated in the ſame ſentence without intermiſſion, and that either a part or a whole word.

An *Epizeuxis* or repetition of the part of a word is either in the beginning or in the end of a word.

An *Epizeuxis* or repetition of a whole word may be in the beginning, middle, or end of a ſentence; as, *Ezek.* 21. 9, 27. *A ſword, a ſword is ſharpened* &c. *I will overturn, overturn, overturn it.* And thus *David* bewaileth the death of his ſon *Abſolon* in 2 *Sam.* 18. 33. *O my ſon* Abſolom, *my ſon, my ſon* Abſolom; *would God I had died for thee, O* Abſolom, *my ſon, my ſon.*

An Anadiploſis is, when a like ſound without intermiſſion is repeated in divers ſentences, that is when it ends one and begins another; as, in Dr. *Donne*'s Poems, *Page* 210.

If then, why I take not my leave ſhe ask,
Aske her again, why ſhe did not unmask?

And

And in the uſe of this Figure there is ſometimes a *Climax*; as when an *Anadiploſis* is continued with many degrees. *Pro* Milon: *Nor did he only render himſelf to the people, but to the Senate: nor to the Senate only, but to the publick Gariſons and Armies: nor to theſe only, but even to him, with whom the Senate hath intruſted the common-wealth.* *Ad* Heren: *What hope of liberty now remaineth; if it be lawful for them to do what they pleaſe, and that they can do what is lawful, and dare do, what they can, and actually do, as much as they dare, and you like whatever they do? Wherein we thought each line, each word, each ſyllable breath'd out the paſſions of a clear and candid ſoul.* Howels *Ep.* 3. *Epiſt.* 18.

Repetition of like ſound but with ſome intermiſſion is either in the *ſame* or in *divers places.*

Repetition of like ſound with intermiſſion in the *ſame place* is either an *Anaphora*, or an *Epiſtrophe.*

An *Anaphora* is, when a like ſound is repeated in the beginning of ſentences; as,

By art of ſails and oars Seas are divided;
By art the Charriot runs; by art love's guided.

Ovid *de Arte amandi. lib.* 1. *Carm.* 3. and 4.

'Tis

'Tis ſafe and frequent, fraud through love frame.

'Tis ſafe and frequent, but deſerveth blam

Ovid *de Arte amandi. lib.* 1. *page* 197.

An *Epiſtrophe* is, when a like ſound is repeated in the cloſe of ſentences; as, 2 Co 11. 22. *Are they Hebrews? ſo am I: are the Iſraelites? ſo am I: are they the ſeed of* Abraham? *ſo am I.*

From an *Anaphora* and an *Epitrophe* joyned together is made another figure calle *Symploce*; which is, when a like ſound both in the beginning and the ending of ſeveral ſentences; as, *Can the hoſt of heave help me? can Angels help me? can theſe inferi our creatures help me.*

Repetition of like ſound with intermiſſion, i divers parts or places, is either an *Epanalipſi* or an *Epanados.*

An *Epanalipſis* is, when a like ſound is repeated in the beginning and ending of the ſame ſentence; as, *In ſorrow was I born and I muſt die in ſorrow.* 1 Cor. 3. 21, 22 *All things are yours, whether things preſent, o things to come, all are yours.*

An *Epanodos* is, when the like ſound i in the beginning and ending of divers ſentences

tences, an *Anadiplosis* coming between; as, Parthenia *desired above all things to have* Argalus; Argalus *feared nothing but to miss* Parthenia. *Isaiah* 5. 20. *Wo unto them who call good evil, and evil good; who put darkness for light, and light for darkness; who glory in their shame, and are ashamed of their glory.*

Whether the worst, the child accurst,
Or else the cruel mother?
The mother worst, the child accurst,
As bad the one as th' other.

Hitherto of the *Figure of a word repeated of like sound*, now follow two figures more made by the repetition of sounds somewhat unlike, *Paronomasia* and *Polyptoton*.

Paronomasia is, when a word being changed in a letter or a syllable, it is also changed in sence and signification; as, *Though you* advise *me to repent, I have not grace to follow your* advice. Eminent *men of great note, are now a days most subject to* imminent *dangers.* 'Tis *not so tedious to me as to others, to be thus* immur'd, *because I have been* inured *and habituated unto troubles.* Howels *Epist.* 1. *Volu. sect.* 6. *Epist.* 50.

A *Polyptoton* is, when words of the ſame original are reiterated but with ſome variation, whether it be in mood or tenſe or perſon or number or any other; as, *Vanity of Vanities, all is vanity. Deceiving and being deceived. The Lord when he viſiteth, in viſiting will viſit you.*

CHAP. VIII.

HItherto of a figure in reference to *words*. A Figure in reference to a *ſentence* is a figure which affecteth the whole ſentence with ſome motion of the mind.

A Figure in reference to a *ſentence* is either in *abſolute reaſoning*, or in reaſoning *Dialogue-wiſe*

Logiſmus or *abſolute reaſoning* is, when a ſentence is compoſed without any talking with other ſuppoſed.

And this is either *Ecphoneſis*, *a recalling of one ſelf*, *Apoſtrophe or Proſopopeia.*

Ecphoneſis is a figure in reaſoning, expreſſed or underſtood by an Adverb of exclaiming: it is a very great inſtrument of moving

moving the mind, and affections of those to whom we speak.

1. By way of *Admiration*; as, *Oh the wonderful clemency!* or, *Oh happy people that are in such a case!*

2. *Derision*; as, *Mark* 15. 29. *Ah thou that destroyest the Temple and buildest it in three days.*

3. *Wishing*; *Psal.* 14. 17. *O that the salvation of Israel were come out of Sion.*

4. *Detestation*; as, *Rom.* 7. 24. *O wrethed man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?*

5. *Reprehension*; as, *O Fooliſh Galathians who hath bewitched you* &c. *Gal.* 3. 1.

6. *Indignation*; *Act.* 13. 10. *O full of all subtilty and miſchief, thou child of the Devil, thou enemy of all righteouſneſs.*

7. *Love*; as, *Pſal.* 84. 1. *O how amiable are thy Tabernacles, thou Lord of hoſts.*

8. *Exultation*; as, 1 *Cor.* 15. 15. *O death where is thy ſting, Oh grave where is thy victory?*

9. *Commiſeration* and *Grief*; as, *Luke* 13. 34. *O Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, which killeſt the Prophets* &c. *How often would I have gathered thy children together*, &c.

12. *Epiphonema* is alſo a kind of exclamation, which is wont to be added to the end

end of the narration or explication of a matter. Thus the Pſalmiſt having highly ſet forth the glorious excellency of the name of God, in *Pſal.* 72. ſhuts up his praiſe with this acclamation; *Bleſſed be his glorious name for ever, and let the whole earth be filled with his glory.*

Recalling of ones ſelf is, when ſomething is called back: and it is as it were a diminution of the over haſtineſs or heat of ſpeech: and this is either *Epanorthóſis* or *Apoſiopéſis*.

An *Epanorthóſis* is, when ſomething preceding is called back by correcting it: as, *I had one only young man to my Son; ah! what have I ſaid? I had? yea I had: it is now uncertain whether I have or not.*

An *Apoſiopéſis* is, when the cloſe of a ſentence begun is ſtopped by keeping in a part which yet is underſtood; as, *you rogue, if I live. Heb.* 3. 11. *To whom I ſware in my wrath, if they enter into my reſt*; i. e. they ſhall never enter into my reſt.

Hitherto of perfect and abſolute reaſoning by way of exclamation and revocation. Now followeth that which is in *Apoſtrophe* and *Proſopopœia*.

An *Apoſtrophe* is, when a ſpeech is directed to another, than was by the ſpeech it ſelf at firſt intended.

And

And this may be done divers ways.
As when a ſpeech is directed
1. To God. 2. To Angels good or bad.
To men in their ſeveral ranks, whether
bſent or preſent, dead or alive, as Ad-
erſaries or friends, to the preſent Auditors,
r ones ſelf. 4. To brute creatures, and 5.
o things inanimate.

A *Proſopopœia* is, when in our Oration,
ve ſuppoſe another perſon to be ſpeaking.
nd by this figure, God, Angels, men dead
r alive, the heavens, earth, ſea, and ſuch
ke are brought in ſpeaking, hearing, &c.
s, *Joſh.* 24. 27. *Behold this ſhall be a witneſs*
nto us; for it hath heard all the words of the
ord which he hath ſpoken unto us.

A *Proſop pœia* is either *imperfect* or *perfect.*
An *Imperfect Proſopopœia* is, when anothers
peech is lightly declared and as it were by
he by; as, *Pſal.* 11. 1. *David* brings in the
vicked as ſaying unto his ſoul, *flee as a Bird*
nto your mountain.

A *perfect Proſopopœia* is when in our own
Oration the whole fiction of another per-
on is plainly declared; as, *Prov.* 8. *Wiſdome*
ryeth at the Gates &c. *Unto you, O men, I*
all, &c.

A Figure in reaſoning *Dialogue-wiſe* is,
when a ſentence is compoſed in form of a
conference

conference; this consisteth in Question and Answer: of which kind of reasoning there are two parts *Hypophora* and *Anthypophora*.

But *Dialogism* or reasoning by Question and Answer is twofold, *Consenting* and *Dissenting*.

Dissenting is when ones answer doth impugne or cross the objection.

A Figure of a *dissenting Dialogism* is either *Deliberation* or *Occupation*.

Deliberation is either an *Aporia* or an *Anacœnósis*.

An *Aporia* is a deliberation with ourselves; as, *Philip.* 1. 22. *But if I live in the flesh, this is the fruit of my labour: yet what I shall chose I know not; for I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, which is far better: nevertheless to abide in the flesh is more needful for you* &c.

An *Anacœnósis* is, a deliberation with others; as thus, *what shall I say? what think you? if it had been your own case, would you have done otherwise?*

Occupation is when we prevent anothers objection and give an answer to it our selves. This *Dialogism* therefore from the former part is called a *Prolepsis*, from the latter a *Prosapódosis*.

A *Prolepsis* or an *Hypophora* propounds the

the objection; as, *Isaiah* 37. 23. *Whom hast thou reproached, and blasphemed? And against whom hast thou exalted thy voice, and lifted up thine eyes on high? even against the holy one of Israel.*

A *Prosapódosis* or an *Anthypophora* answers the objection; as, *Rom.* 6. 15. *What then? shall we sin because we are not under the law, but under grace? God forbid.*

A *Prolepsis* for the most part hath a *Prosopopœia* joyned with it, and is therefore either *oblique* or *recti*.

An *Oblique Prolepsis* is that which hath an imperfect *Prosopopœia* joyned with it.

A *Recti Prolepsis* is that which hath a full *Prosopopœia*; as, some one may say, *is this then your Discipline? Do you thus instruct youth?*

A Figure of *Consenting Dialogism* is, when ones answer doth admit of the objection expressed or understood: yet so, as that from thence the inconsequence of the objection may be shewed, if need be.

But this is either an *Epitrope* or a *Synchoresis*.

An *Epitrope* is when any ones fact is freely permitted. This is twofold *Serious* or *Ironical*.

Serious permission; as, *Take this Church*

plaise, seeing thou hast need, for 'twas thy Ancestors gift.

Ironical permission; as, Eccles. 11. 9. *Rejoyce O young man, and let thy heart cheer thee, &c. And walk in the ways of thy heart, &c.*

A *Synchoresis* is when some word or deed is forgiven; as, *let him be sacrilegious, let him be a theef, let him be the vilest person in the world; for all that he is a good Governour. James 2. 19. Thou believest that there is one God, thou dost well: the Devils also believe and tremble.*

CHAP. IX.

Of Secundary Figures.

TO these *Primary Figures* of words and sentences there may some *secundary figures* be added in both kinds.

The

The *Secundary figures of a word* are eight.

1. *Ellipſis.*
2. *Pleonaſmus.*
3. *Aſyndeton.*
4. *Polyſyndeton.*
5. *Hyperbaton.*
6. *Zeugma.*
7. *Antitheſis.*
8. *Græciſmus.*

An *Ellipſis* is, when ſome neceſſary word, to expreſs the paſſion, is omitted in the conſtruction; as, *Iſaiah* 1. 13. *I cannot iniquity*, that is, I cannot bear iniquity.

A *Pleonaſmus* is, when there is ſome word in an oration, more than it ſeemeth to need; yet doth emphatically and eminently expreſs ſome vehemence and certainty; as, *I ſaw it with theſe eyes.* And that which hath not ſuch an Emphaſis is idle and vicious.

An *Aſyndeton* is, when in a number of words, a conjunction copulative is omitted, either through haſt, or vehemence of ſpeech; as, *By thy folly and wickedneſs thou haſt loſt thy ſubſtance, thy good name, thy friends, thy parents, and offended thy Creator.*

A *Polyſyndeton* is, when for gravity ſake, more conjunctions are uſed than ſeem needful, but not without ſome Emphaſis; as, *overmuch ſleep alſo, and wine, and banquets, and queans, and bathes enervate and enfeeble the body and mind.*

An *Hyperbaton* is a *Tranſpoſition* of words from the right order of conſtruction, into ſome more neat and compact form, for elegancy and variety ſake; as, *Epheſ.* 1. *And you hath he quickened who were dead in treſpaſſes and ſins.*

A *Zeugma* is, when ſome verb or adjective but once expreſſed in a ſentence, is ſuppoſed to be referred to ſeveral others of divers genders, numbers or perſons, agreeing with that which is neareſt; as, *luſt overcometh modeſty, boldneſs fear,* and *paſſion reaſon.*

This is threefold.

Prozeugma, when this common word is ſet in the beginning; as, *For neither art thou he,* Cataline, *whom ſhame could at any time call back from diſhoneſty, fear from perils, or reaſon from madneſs.*

Meſozeugma, when in the middle; as, *what a ſhame is this, that neither hope of reward, nor fear of reproach could any thing move him, the perſwaſion of his friends, nor the love of his Country?*

Hypozeugma, when in the end; as, *the foundation of freedome, the fountain of equity, the ſafeguard of wealth, and cuſtody of life is preſerved by law.*

An *Antitheſis* is, when the things oppoſed do anſwer one another; as, *Flattery procureth*

reth friendſhip, truth hatred.

A *Græciſmus* is when the proper Idiom of the Greek is uſed in another ſpeech or language; as, *Edm. Spencer Chap. 13. For not to have been dipt in* Lethe *lake, could ſave the ſon of* Thetis *from to die*; that is, *Achilles.*

To theſe may be added

An *Hyperologia* or an *Hyteron Proteron*, when that which in the natural order ſhould be firſt ſpoken, is brought in laſt; as, *he is in health and alive*, for, he is alive and in health.

An *Antiptoſis*, when one caſe is put for another.

An *Hypallage*, when two words do commute or change caſes with one another; as, *Thou haſt hid their heart from underſtanding, Job* 17. 4. that is, thou haſt hid underſtanding from their heart.

The Secundary figures in a ſentence are ten.

1. *Parrhéſia.*
2. *Eroteſis.*
3. *Parentheſis.*
4. *Paratheſis.*
5. *Peripbraſis.*
6. *Synonymia.*
7. *Hypotypoſis.*
8. *Præmunitio.*
9. *Tranſitio.*
10. *Rejectio.*

Parrhèſia is a free and a bold ſpeaking of

ſuch things in their preſence whom we ſhould fear or reverence, as are diſpleaſing or may provoke them to envy.

And this is either when we confidently acknowledge and defend a fault not proved againſt us, or when we boldly upbraid and rebuke others, for faults by them committed.

Eroteſis is a manner of ſpeech, whereby we either,

1. Demand a queſtion; as, *How oft ſhall my brother ſin againſt me, and I forgive him? till ſeven times?* *Matth.* 18. 21. Or when we

2. Earneſtly affirm and reprehend; as, *O faithleſs Generation! how long ſhall I be with you? how long ſhall I ſuffer you?* Mark 9. 19. Or when we

3. Vehemently avouch the contrary, whether the interrogation be affirmative or negative; as, *can the blind lead the blind? ſhall they not both fall into the ditch?* that is, the blind cannot lead the blind, they ſhall both fall.

Parentheſis is the interpoſing of one or more words of perfect ſence, within another ſentence, for the perfecting thereof; without which interpoſition, the ſence would yet be perfect and entire.

Con-

Concerning which, two rules are obſervеable, viz.

1. That the interpoſition ſhould neither be long, nor frequent, becauſe it will render the ſentence obſcure.

2. That one *Parenthesis* be but ſeldome inſerted within another; as, *Are they miniſters of Chriſt (I ſpeak as a fool) I am more*; 2 *Cor.* 11. 23.

Parathesis, is a figure of conſtruction, whereby one ſubſtantive is for declaration and diſtinction ſake added unto another in the ſame caſe; as, *the river* Iſis, or *the river* Wye. Judas *ſaith unto him, not* Iſcariot. *John* 14. 22.

Periphraſis, is the explication of a thing by more words, which may be expreſſed by one.

This figure is principally made four ways.

1. When ſome notable enterpriſe, ones native countrey, or ſome ſtrange ſect or opinion, is put inſtead of the proper name; as, *The writer of the Trojan war* for Homer.

2. In *Etymology*, when the cauſe or reaſon of a name is unfolded; as, *a man ſtudious of wiſdom*, for a Philoſopher.

3. In *Annotation*, when by certain marks or tokens ſomething is deſcribed; as, *Anger is a vehement heat of the mind, which brings*

paleneſs to the countenance, burning to the eyes, and trembling to the parts of the body.

4. When a thing is deſcribed by definition; as, *the art of ſpeaking eloquently*, for Rhetorick. *An oppreſſor of the laws and liberties of the people*, for a Tyrant.

Synonymia or *Paliloga*, is a heaping together of many words of one ſignification; as, *Wiſdome in a poor man lyes as a thing deſpiſed, rejected, oppreſſed, buried and utterly extinct.*

Hypotypoſis is a figure by which a whole matter is particularly and orderly expreſſed, as that it ſeems to be repreſented unto ocular inſpection; as, *It is a place which now humbling it ſelf in fallowed plains, now proud in well husbanded hills, marries barren woods to cultivated valleys, and joyns neat gardens to delicious fountains*, &c.

Præmunition or preparation is, when we preſuppoſe what may be ſaid by way of defence for thoſe, whom we intend to reprehend or reprove.

Tranſition is that by which the parts of an oration are joyned together. And this is

1. *Perfect*, by which is declared what hath been ſpoken, and what remaineth to be ſaid; as, *hitherto we have ſpoken of tillage and Aſtronomy, now we will treat of* &c.

2. *Imperfect*

2. *Imperfect*, by which is declared either what hath been ſaid, or what remaineth to be ſpoken.

This may be done eight ſeveral ways.

1. By ſomething that is equal or parallel; as, *Thoſe are moſt pleaſant, nor are theſe leſs delightful.*

2. By ſomething that is unequal; *you have heard very ſad things; but I ſhall now tell you ſadder things than theſe.*

3. By ſomething that is like.

4. By ſomething that is contrary; *Theſe things he did when he was young; hear now his vertuous progreſs in his elder days.*

5. By ſomething that is divers; as, *you have heard of his behaviour, I will now inform you of his learning.*

6. By preoccupation; as, *We will now haſten to the reſt, only give me leave to adde this one thing.*

7. By reprehenſion; *Why ſhould I dwell on this ſubject; I haſten to that which is the cauſe of all.*

8. From ſome conſequent or relative; as, *you have heard what I have done for him; hear now how he hath requited me.*

Rejection is, when we deferre a thing to ſome other time or place, or wholly reject it as abſurd and impertinent, and by no-

means to be admitted of; as, *But of* Luculus *I will ſpeak in ſome other place: and I will ſpeak ſo, as that my ſpeech ſhall not falſely accuſe him, or yet derogate from his juſt praiſe.*

And thus much concerning *Elocution*. As for *Memory* and *Pronunciation*, which are the other two parts of Rhetorick, I purpoſely omit them, as being natural endowments, which may be better improved by conſtant practice, than by any precepts which can be given.

Laus Deo.

Δόξα τῷ Θεῷ

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An Alphabetical Table in which the *Tropes* and *Figures* which are of a *Greek* Original are interpreted and explained.

Allegoria, ἀλληγορία, inversion or changing, when one thing is propounded in the words, and another in the sence; it comes from ἄλλο *aliud*, and ἀγορία, i. e. ἀγορεύω *dico*, to speak otherwise than we think.

Anacœnosis, ἀναχοίνωσις, communication; it comes from ἀνὰ and χοινόω *communico*.

Anadiplosis, ἀναδίπλωσις, redup ication; it is derived of ἀνὰ again a. d διπλόω to double.

Anaphora, ἀνάφορα, relation; it is derived from ἀναφέρω to bring again, or to rehearse.

Anthypophora

Anthypophora, ἀνθυποφορὰ, ſubjection; it comes from ἀνθυποφέρω to object or oppoſe a contrary ſentence.

Antiptoſis, ἀντίπτωσις, the putting of one caſe for another; it is derived from ἀντὶ for, and πτῶσις, a caſe.

Antitheſis, ἀντίθεσις, oppoſition, ſet or placed againſt; it is derived from ἀντὶ *contra*, and τίθημι *pono*, to put againſt.

Aphæreſis, ἀφαίρεσις, a taking a way; it comes from ἀφαιρέομαι, *aufero*.

Apocope, ἀποκοπὴ, *abſciſſio*, a cutting off; it comes from ἀποκόπτω, *abſcindo*.

Apodioxis, ἀποδίωξις, rejection, or expulſion; it is derived from ἀποδιώκω, *rejicio*, to reject or expel.

Apophaſis, ἀπόφασις, negation or denying, it is derived from ἀποφημι, *nego* to deny.

Aporia, ἀπορία, *addubitatio* doubting; it is derived from ἀπορέω, *ambigo*, *dubito*, *animum pendeo*, to be of a doubtful mind or not to know what is beſt to be ſaid or done.

Apoſiopeſis, ἀποσιώπησις, *reticentia* a holding ones peace; it is derived from ἀπὸ after and σιωπάω-ήσω, *obticeo* to be ſilent.

Apoſtrophe, ἀποστροφὴ, *averſio*, a turning away; it is derived from ἀπὸ from, and στρέφω *verto* to turn.

Aſyndeton, ἀσύνδετον, *inconjunctum* disjoyned,

ned; it is also called διάλυτον, *dissolutum*; an oration in which the copulative particles are omitted; it is derived from the privative particle α and σύνδετος *colligatus*, bound together, and that is derived from δέω *ligo* to bind.

Auxesis, αὔξησις, *augmentum* an increasing; it is derived from αὐξέω ῶ (for which we now use αὔξω) because it doth increase a matter or thing by amplification.

C

Catachresis, Κατάχρησις, *abusio*, abuse, it comes from καταχράομαι ᾶμαι, *abutor*, to abuse, or from the prepositon κατὰ, *contra* against, and χρῆσις, *usus* use.

Climax, κλίμαξ, *gradatio*, gradation or climing by steps; it is derived from κλίνω *declino* to bend towards, or incline to.

D

Diæresis, διαίρεσις, *divisio*, division, it is derived from διαιρέω, *divido*, to divide; it is also called διάλυσις *dissolutio* dissolution, from διαλύω *dissolvo* to dissolve.

Diastole, διαστολὴ, extention, or dilation, a figure whereby a syllable, short by nature, is

is made long; it comes from τείνω *extendo*, *præt. med.* ἴσολα, and being compounded with the prepoſition διὰ σολή.

E

Ecphoneſis, ἐκφώνησις, exclamation or crying out; it is derived from ἐκφωνέω *exclamo* to cry out.

Ecthlipſis, ἔκθλιψις, *eliſio*, a ſtriking out; it comes from the verb ἐκθλίβω *elido*.

Ellipſis, ἔλλειψις, *defectus*, defect or want; it is derived from ἐλλείπω, *deficio*, to lack, or want.

Epanalepſis, ἐπανάληψις, *reſumtio*, a taking back; it is derived from ἐπὶ after, ἀνὰ again, and λαμβάνω, *accipio*, to take; from whence comes λῆψις *acceptio* a taking.

Epanados, ἐπάνοδος, *regreſſio*, regreſſion, a turning back; derived from ἐπὶ again, and ἄνοδος, *aſcenſus*, an aſcending or climing up; which is derived from ἄνω *ſurſum* upwards, and ὁδὸς *via* a way.

Epanorthoſis, ἐπανόρθωσις, *correctio*, *emendatio*, correction or amending; derived from ἐπανορθῶ *corrigo*, to correct or amend.

Epentheſis, ἐπένθεσις, *interpoſitio*, interpoſition, or putting in between; it comes from ἐπιτίθημι, *interpono*, to interpoſe.

Epiphonema,

Epiphonema, ἐπιφώνημα, acclamation, or a shooting out of the voice; derived from ἐπιφωνέω, *acclamo*, to cry out or shoot forth the voice.

Epistrophe, ἐπιστροφή, *conversio*, a conversion, or turning to the same sound; derived from ἐπὶ *prope* near to, and στρέφω *verto* to turn or change.

Epitrope, ἐπιτροπή, *permissio*, permission, derived from ἐπιτρέπω, *permitto*, to permit or grant.

Epizeuxis, ἐπιζεύξις, *adjunctio*, a joyning together of the same word or sound, derived from ἐπιζεύγνυμι *conjungo*, to joyn together.

Eroteſis, ἐρώτησις, *interrogatio*, interrogation or questioning; derived from ἐρωτάω, *interrogo* to question.

G

Græciſmus, γραικισμὸς, *immutatio Græcorum*, from γραικὸς *græcus*, a certain King from whom that Countrey was called *Greece*.

H

Hypallage, ὑπαλλαγὴ, *immutatio*, a changing; derived from ὑπὸ *in*, and ἀλλάττω *mutio*, to change.

Hyperbaton,

Hyperbaton; ὑπέρβατον, *tranſgreſſio*, tranſgreſſion, or a paſſing over, derived from ὑπερβαίνω, *tranſgredior* to paſs over.

Hyperbole; ὑπερβολὴ, *ſuperlatio*, a paſſing of meaſure, or bounds; derived from ὑπερβάλλω, *ſupero* to exceed.

Hypophora, ὑποφορὰ, *objectio*, an objection; it is derived from ὑποφέρω, *objicio*, to object.

Hypotypoſis, ὑποτύπωσις, *evidentia*, & *illuſtratio*, illuſtration, when a thing is ſo expreſſed in writing, that the figure thereof may ſeem to be delineated; it is derived from ὑποτυπῶ, *repreſento*, to repreſent, to delineate by figure, or to draw the lively effigies of a thing.

Hyſterologia, ὑστερολογία, *dictio præpoſtera*, a præpoſterous ſpeech, when that is ſpoken laſt which according to order ought to have been firſt, it is otherwiſe called ὕστερον πρότερον, *poſtremum primum*, the laſt firſt; derived from ὕστερος *poſtremus* the laſt or hindmoſt, and λόγος *verbum* a word or ſpeech.

I

Ironia, εἰρωνεία, *ſimulatio*, *irriſio*, mocking or counterfeiting; from εἴρω *dico*, from whence εἴρων, *ſimulator*, which ſpeaketh otherwiſe.

herwise than he thinks; and hence εἰρωνία taken for dissimulation, whereby one thing is thought and another spoken.

L

Logismus, λογισμὸς, *cogitatio*, musing or thinking; it comes from λογίζομαι *præt.* λελόγισμαι.

M

Meiosis, μείωσις, *imminutio*, diminution or extenuation, it comes from μειόω, *minuo*, to diminish.

Metalepsis μετάληψις, *transumptio*, a taking from one to another; it is derived from μεταλαμβάνω, *transumo*, to take of or from another.

Metaphora, μεταφορὰ, translation, it comes from μεταφέρω *transfero* to translate.

Metaplasmus, μεταπλασμὸς, transformation, or a changing from one shape to another; it comes from μεταπλάττω, *transformo*, to transform.

Metathesis, μετάθεσις, *transpositio*, transposition; it comes from μετὰ, *trans* over or beyond, and τίθημι *pono* to put.

Meeter, μέτρον, *mensura*, a measure or verse,

verſe conſiſting of the meaſures of certain feet, from μοῖρα comes μοιζω and μόιζον and by taking away ρ it is μόιζον.

Metonymia, μετωνυμία, *tranſnominatio*, a change of names, it comes from μετὰ, which in compoſition ſignifies change, and ὄνομα *nomen* a name.

P

Paragoge, παραγωγὴ, *productio*, a making long; it comes from παράγω, *produco*, to draw in length, to prolong.

Paralipſis, παράλειψις, *præteritio* an overpaſſing; derived from παραλείπω, to pretermit or leave out.

Paratheſis, παράθεσις, *appoſitio*, appoſition or a putting of one thing to another; it is derived from παρατίθημι *appono*.

Parenthesis, παρένθεσις, interpoſition, or an inſerting between; derived from παρεντίθημι *inſero*, to interpoſe or caſt between.

Paranomaſia, παρονομασία, agnomination or likeneſs of words; derived from παρὰ which in compoſition ſignifies amiſs, or with ſome alteration, and ὄνομα *nomen* a name.

Parrheſia, παρρησία, *licentia*, liberty or boldneſs of ſpeaking, it is derived from πᾶν, and ῥῆσις licenſe and liberty.

Peri-

Periphraſis, περίφρασις, *circumlocutio*, a ſpeaking of many words when few may ſuffice, περιφράζομαι *circumloquor* to utter that in many words which may be ſpoke in few.

Pleonaſmus, πλεονασμὸς, *redundantia*, ſuperfluity; it is derived from πλεονάζω *redundo* to abound ſuperfluously.

Polyptoton, πολύπτωτον, *variatio caſuum*, a change of the termination or caſe, and it is derived from πολὺ, *variè*, variouſly, and πτῶσις *cadens* falling or ending.

Polyſyndeton, πολυσύνδετον, *variè et multipliciter conjunctum*, diverſly and many ways joyned together; it is derived from πολὺ *multùm* very much, and σύνδετος, *conjunctus* joyned together.

Prolepſis, πρόλῆψις, the anticipation, or prevention of an objection; it is derived from πρὸ *præ* before, λαμβάνω *capio*, to take, *præterf.* 1. λέλημμαι λέλῆφα, and thence λῆψις, and with the præpoſition πρόλῆψις.

Proſapodoſis, προσαπόδοσις, *redditio*, a giving again, it comes from προσαποδίδωμι, *reddo* to reſtore.

Proſopopœia, προσωποποιία, *fictio perſonæ*, the feigning of a perſon, it is derived from πρόσωπον, *perſona*, & ποιέω *facio vel fingo* to make or feign.

Proſtheſis, πρόθεσις *appoſitio*, a putting of one

one letter to another, it is derived from προσ τίθημι *appono* to put or adde unto.

R

Rhetorica, ῥητορικὴ, Rhetorick; it is derived from ῥέω, *dico*, εἴρω being out of use, *fut.* ἐρῶ *præt.* ἔρρηκα *Atticè* εἴρηκα, *præt. paſ.* ἔρρημαι ἔρρησαι ἔρρηται and thence comes ῥῆμα, ῥῆσις, ῥητὸς and ῥητορικὴ.

Rhyme, ῥύθμος, meeter or ſuch a number as is in muſick; it is derived from ῥύσμος by changing σ into θ and that comes from ῥύω ῥύσω *trabo* to draw or allure.

S

Symploce, συμπλοκὴ, *complexio*, *cõplicatio*, an agreement of words in a ſentence, it is derived from συμπλέκω, *complico*, *connecto*, to wrap or couple together.

Synalœpha, συναλοιφὴ, *vocalium commixtio*, a mingling together of vowels, a bringing two ſyllables into one; it is derived from συναλείφω *ſimul ungo* to anoint together, metaphorically uſed for *commiſceo* to mingle together, *in unum contrabo* to contract in one.

Synchoreſis, συγχώρησις, *conceſſio*, granting of an argument; it is derived from συγχωρέω *concedo* tog rant.

Syn-

Syncope, συγκοπὴ, *concisio*, a cutting away, it is derived from συγκόπτω *concido* to cut in pieces.

Synæresis, συναίρεσις, *contractio*, a contraction, it comes from συναιρέω *in unum contraho* to contract into one.

Synecdoche, συνεκδοχὴ, comprehension, derived from συνεκδέχομαι, *comprehendo vel una excipio*, to comprehend or take together.

Synonymia, συνωνυμία, *nominis communio*, a pertaking together of a name, or divers words signifying one and the same thing; it is derived from σὺν *simul* together and ὄνομα *nomen* a name or word.

Systole, συστολὴ, *correptio* a shortning.

T

Tapinosis, ταπείνωσις, *humiliatio* submission, it comes from ταπεινόω ῶ *humilem reddo*, to be humble, or to submit,

Tmesis, τμῆσις, *sectio*, *divisio*, a section, a dividing; it is derived from τέμνω *seco* to cut *præt. pass.* τέτμημαι σπ τμ, from whence τμῆμα τμῆσις, τμητὸς.

Zeugma, ζεῦγμα, *junctura*, a joyning or coupling together; it is derived from ζεύγνυμι, *jungo* to joyn or couple.

FINIS.

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Thomas
Herbert